the system of judicial review. Such a system may delay changes but should not, I think, speaking entirely for myself, deny or defeat the right of the people to bring about any change, whether basic or not, in the Constitution. Indeed, in Kesvananda"s case (AIR 1973 SC 1461) (supra), I indicated that I thought that the most proper and appropriate function of the amending power in a Constitution, which is also a part of the Constitution, and, indeed, its most potent part — was that of making basic changes so as to avert constitutional break-downs and revolutions if possible. However, we are precluded from acting upon such a broad view of amending power in this case as we are bound by the majority opinion in Kesvananda's case (supra) that implied limitations of "a basic structure", operating from even outside the language of Art, 368, as it stood before the 24th amendment, restrict its scope. These limitations must however, be related to provisions of the Constitution. 576. It has not been argued before us that the introduction by the 24th amendment of the new clause (1) in Article 368, containing the "constituent power", itself amplifies or increases the contents or changes the character of the power in Article 368 by making it a composite power so as to include a new type of judicial or quasi-judicial power also within its fold now. It is evident from the judgments of learned judges of this Court in Golaknath's case (AIR 1967 SC 1643) (supra) that possible distinctions between amending power and "constituent power" and "Sovereign power" figured prominently in arguments in that case. Wanchoo, J., in his minority opinion (see: 1967 (2) SCR 762 at p. 833) = (AIR 1967 SC 1643 at p. 1679-80) said that it was not necessary, for the purposes of that case, to decide whether the amending power was as wide as the "sovereign power" of the Constituent Assembly which had framed our Constitution. After all the discussion that had taken place then, came the 24th amendment. It does not use the words "sovereignty" or "sovereign power". I presume that the words "constituent power" were advisedly used in it so as to clarify the position and not to put in or to include anything beyond constitution making power in Art. 368. 577. The "constituent power" is still bound by the exclusively prescribed procedure to "amend by way of addition, variation, or repeal" any provision of the Constitution. It is entirely a law making procedure elaborately set out in clause (2). In fact, Art. 368 contains so much of the fundamental law making or legislative procedure that five judges of this Court, led by Subba Rao, C. J. opined in Golaknath's case (AIR 1967 SC 1643) (supra), that it was confined to procedure and did not contain at all the substantive power to amend. Clause (1) of Art. 368, introduced by the 24th amendment, was, apparently, meant to remove this objection and to do no more. It could not be in tended to pour some new amalgam of executive and judicial or quasi-judicial substantive powers into it also by some implication so as to do away with the very need for such an elaborate and carefully drawn up Constitution such as ours. The absence of any quasi-judicial procedure, from the comprehensively framed procedural provisions of Art. 368, seems extremely significant. It indicates that it was the clear intention of Constitution makers that no