whom vested all the legislative, judicial and executive powers of the State. In the case of an absolute Ruler like the Maharana of Udaipur, it is difficult to make any distinction between an executive order issued by him or a legislative command issued by him. Any order, issued by such a Ruler has the force of law and did govern the rights of the parties affected thereby. This position is covered by decisions of this Court and it has not been disputed before us, Vide Madhaorao Phalke v. the State of Madhya Bharat, (1960) ISCR 957 = (AIR 1961 SC 298) Ammer-un-Nisa Begum v. Mahboob Begum. (AIR 1955 SC 352), and Director of Endowments, Government of Hyderabad v. Akram Ali, (AIR 1956 SC 60)." 582. It is evident, from the quotation, relied upon by the Solicitor-General, that this Court was not deciding whether the Firman was even a "law" in the sense of a general norm which had to be applied to the decision of cases. It was held that whatever be its juristic character, it had the "force of law" inasmuch as the Ruler of Udaipur was an absolute ruler, who combined in his person the legislative, the judicial and executive authority of the State. That was the Constitution of Udaipur. The doctrine of separation of powers, in such a context, was really irrelevant. Art, 368 of our Constitution, however, is not a power acquired by our Republic by State Succession from the powers of Indian ruling princes. The legislative history behind it is entirely different. 583. As a matter of legislative history, we will find the source of the "constituent power" in Sections 6 and 8 of the Indian Independence Act passed by the British Parliament. Section 6 of that Act constituted a "Legislature" for each of two Dominions set up with plenary powers of legislation. The legislative powers of the Legislature of each Dominion were so enlarged by Sec. 8 that it could frame the Constitution of the dominion concerned. This was a transfer of only a legislative power. Sec 8 said: "for the purpose of making provision as to the Constitution of the dominion, the legislature of the dominion was recognised as the constituent assembly of the dominion". These powers were "plenary" in the sense in which this term is used in Queen v Burah. (1878) 5 Ind App 178 (PC) but they were confined to law making and did not extend to adjudication or decision of individual cases which is certainly distinguishable from a law making power. For purposes other than framing of the constitution, provisions of the Government of India Act operated until they were repealed and replaced by other relevant provisions. Such was the process of a legislative succession through which institutional transformation or transition to a new but corresponding set of institutions was brought about. In the eyes of law, this was an evolutionary process through constitutional channels and not a revolutionary break with the past. 584. It is true that, in the exercise of the law making constituent power, brought in by Sec. 8 of the Indian Independence Act. the legislatures could be armed with judicial powers as well if appropriate laws were made to that effect. But, as no law, either Constitutional or ordinary was passed, preceding 39th amendment, to repeal the Act of 1951 and then to vest a judicial power in Parliament, so as to enable it to take over and decide election disputes