decide election disputes itself. It had transferred this power to Courts by statute and has not resumed it. In fact the law enacted in the Representation of People Act 1949, by the British Parliament confirmed this transfer or delegation of power. Section 107 of that Act makes it clear like Art 329 (b) of our Constitution that the stautory remedies are the only ones open for election disputes. 591. The reasons why the House of Commons itself saw the need for entrusting to a rota of High Court Judges the jurisdiction at one time exercised by it directly to determine its election disputes is found thus stated by BLACKSTONE, quoting Erskine May's "Parliamentary Practice and Procedure" (at p. 153-155); "For a considerable time after the house had obtained this jurisdiction controverted elections were tried by committees specially nominated composed of privy councillors and burgesses, well qualified for the duties entrusted to them. But after 1672 it became an open committee, in which all who came had voices and at length a hearing at the bar of the House was considered preferable to an inquiry by a committee. Here again to use the words of Sir Erskine May, "the partiality and injustice of the judges was soon notorious. Parties tried their strength – the friends or rival candidates canvassed and manoeuvred, and seats corruptly gained, were as corruptly protected or voted away. Such were the results of the usurpation of judicial functions by a popular body." In order to remedy, if possible, these unquestionable evils, the statute 10 Geo III C. 16 called from its author the Grenville Act, was passed in 1770 and the trial of election petitions transfered to a select committee of thirteen members, which it was thought would be 'a court independent of the house, though composed of its own members'. For a time there was a marked improvement in the decision of controverted elections. 'But too soon it became evident that corruption and party spirit had not been overcome. Crowds now attended the ballot, as they had previously come to the vote – not to secure justice but to aid their own political friends'. The party, whether of the petitioner or sitting member which attended in the greatest number inevitably had the numerical majority of names drawn for the committee and from this list, the petitioner and sitting member struck out alternately one name until the committee was reduced to thirteen: the majority of the house was necessarily a majority of the committee. The result it was not difficult to foresee. Though the members were sworn to do justice between the rival candidates yet the circumstances under which they were notoriously choosen, their own party bias and a lax conventional morality favoured by the obscurity and in consistencies of the election law and by the conflicting decisions of incapable tribunals led to this equivocal result: that the right was generally discovered to be on the side of the candidate who professed the same political opinions as the majority of the committee'. 'By these means the majority of the hose continued with less directness and certainty and perhaps with less open scandal to nominate their own