Article 368 is not ordinary law making which is subject to Article 13 (2) or any other Article of the Constitution. This view of Wancho., J., was adopted by Parliament in the Constitution 24th Amendment Act which made explict that under Article 368 Parliament has the constituent power to amend this Constituion." 597. On the other hand, learned Counsel defending the 39th Amendment relied on a number of passages from various judgments including mine in Kesavananda Bharti's case (AIR 1973 SC 1461) (supra) indicating that at least the minority view there was that the power of amendment contained in Article 368 was only limited by the procedure laid down in Article 368 (2) of the Constitution and nothing else. It is true that this is what was emphasized by several learned Judges including myself in dealing with a case where the real question was whether the constituent power embraced an amedment of the Constitution in such a way as to take away fundamental rights. but neither the question whether "constituent power" itself contained judicial power within its hold nor the question whether “constituent power” operated on a plane or in a sphere which excluded altogether what could be done through ordinary legislation were under the consideration in Kesavananda's case (supra). Some passages were cited from my judgement in that case indicating that the constituent plane of basic changes excluded the ordinary law makig plane of legislation, the two belonging, so to speak, to different spheres or orbits of operation. I think I had only cited Prof. Ernest Barker's statement of his theory some of which could convey that sense. But, I had not committed myself to a view on the question whether there was a limit on the subject matter of constituent law making. 598. It could be and has been argued not without force that there are no legal limitations upon the subject matter which may be considered fit for inclusion or incorporatin in a constitution. This is left to the good sense of the Constitution makers. Constitutions differ greately in this respect (See: Where's "Modern Constitution" pp. 49 to 51). What may be the ideal from this point of view is not always the actual. Reference was also made in support of this submission to Rottschaefer on "Constituional Law" (1939 Edn. p. 10). It is not necessary to pursue this question any further here. 599. I had said, in Kesavananda's case (AIR 1973 SC 1461) (supra) after dealing with amending power in Article 368, on the assumption that it was an exercise of a "Soverign power" (at p. 870) (of SCR) = (at p. 1975 of AIR). "No doubt the judicial organ has to decide the question of the limits of a sovereign authority as well as that of other authorities in cases of dispute. But when these authorities act within these limits, it cannot interfere". In other words, I look upon a "sovereign power" itself, under the Constitution as limited by the supremacy of the Constitution. 600. If the constitutional provisions compel us to hold as I think they do that no form of judicial or quasi-judicial power is included in the "constituent power". contained in Article 368 of the Constitution, no further question need really be considered by us if we were to hold that the insertion of clause (4) in