the fundamental rights of Bond. This is not an authority for the proposition that the decision of the House on an election dispute would be open to judicial review. 45. The case of Powell v. McCormack. (1969) 23 L Ed 2d 491 (supra) is also one of disqualification by the House of a Congressman on the basis of qualification which the House added to those specified in the Constitution. In other words, the House purported to unseat a member by disqualifying him on a ground not given in the Constitution. This was not a case of deciding an election dispute. under the statute in question the Federal District Court had jurisdiction over all civil actions where controversy arises under the Constitution. This was a case entertained on the ground that exclusion of a member of the House was unconstitutional. This case is an authority for the proposition that if a power is committed to a particular organ the court cannot edjudicate upon it. Where a power is exercised by one organ, which is not committed to that particular organ of the State and such exercise of power is violative of a constitutional provision the matter becomes cognizable by courts. The Court held that a question of unconstitutional exclusion of a member is not barred from judicial review as a political question. 46. Judicial review is not to be founded on any Article similar to the American Constitution. In the Australian Constitution also the judicial power is locatd in the court. The doctrine of separation of powers is carried into effect in countries like America, Australia. In our Constitution there is separation of powers in a broad sense. But the large question is whether there is any doctrine of separation of powers when it comes to exercise of constituent power. The doctrine of separation of powers as recognised in America is not applicable to our coutry. (See Delhi Laws Act, 1951 SCR 747 at pp., 965-66 = (AIR 1951 SC 332 at p. 395); Javantilal Sodhan v. F.N. Rana (1964) 5 SCR 294 = (AIR 1964 SC 648) Chandra Mohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh. (1967) 1 SCR 77 at p. 87 = (AIR 1966 SC 1987 at p. 1993) and Udai Ram Sharma v. Union of India. (1968) 3 SCR 41 at p. 67 = (AIR 1968 SC 1138 at p (1152). 47. The rigid separation of power as under the American Constitution of under the Australian Constitution does not apply to our country. Many powers which are strictly judicial have been excluded from the purview of the courts. The whole subject of election has been left to courts traditionally under the Common Law and election disputes matters are governed by the Legislature. The question of the determination of election disputes has particularly been related as a special privilege of Parliament in England. It is a political question in the United States, Under our Constitution Parliament has inherited all the privileges, powers and immunities of the British House of Commons. In the case of election disputes Parliament has defined the procedure by law. It can at any time change that procedure and take over itself the whole question. There is therefore, no question of any separation of powers being involved in matters concerning elections and election petitions. 48. When the constituent power exercises powers the constituent power comprises legislative, executive and judicial powers. All powers flow from the constitutent power through the Constitution to the various departments or heads. In the hands of the constituent authority there is no demarcation of powers. It is only when the constituent authoity defines the authorities or demarcates the areas that separation of power is discussed. The constituent power is independent of the