ordinary course of the laws in the speedy and effectual prosecution of so heinous and dangerous an offence. "Since that time" the Committee of Privileges said in 1831 "it has been considered as established generally, that privilege is not claimable for any indictable offence". 82. These being the general declarations of the law of Parliament, the House will not allow even the sanctuary of its walls to protect a Member from the process of criminal law although a service of a criminal process on a Member within the precincts of Parliament whilst the House is sitting without obtaining the leave of the House would be a breach of privilege. 83. The committal of a Member in England for high treason or any criminal offence is brought before the House by a letter addressed to the Speaker by the committing judge or magistrate. Where a Member is convicted but released on bail pending an appeal the duty of the Magistrate to communicate with the Speaker does not arise. No duty of informing the Speaker arises in the case of a person who while in prison under sentence of a court is elected as a Member of Parliament in the case of detention of Members under Regulation 14-B of the Defence of Realm Regulations in England, the communication was made to the Speaker by a letter from the Chief Secretary to the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland which was read to the House by the Speaker. The detention of a Member under Regulation 18-B of the Defence (General) Regulations, 1939, made under the Emergency Powers (Defence) Acts, 1939 and 1940, led to the committee of Privileges being directed to consider whether such detention constituted a breach of the privileges of the House : the Committee reported that there was no breach of privilege involved. In the case of a member deported from Northern Rhodesia for non-compliance with an order declaring him to be a prohibited immigrant the Speaker held there was no prima facie case of breach of privilege (See May's Parliamentary Practice 18th Ed. p. 103). 84. In K. Anandan Nambia v. Chief Secretary Government of Madras, (1966) 2 SCR 406 = (AIR 1966 SC 657) the petitioners who were members of the Parliament and detained by orders passed by the State Government under R. 30 (1) (b) of the Defence of India Rules, 1962 challenged the validity of the orders of detention on the ground that Rule 30 (1) (b) was not valid because "a legislator cannot be detained so as to prevent him from exercising his constitutional rights as such legislator while the legislative chamber to which he belongs is in session." The State raised a preliminary objection that the petitions were incompetent in view of the order issued by the President under Article 359 (1) suspending the rights of any person to move any Court for the enforcement of rights conferred by Articles 14, 21 and 22. This court held that the validity of the Act, Rule or order made under the Presidential Order could not be questioned on the ground that they contravene Articles 14, 21 and 22. 85. The petitioners also contended in Nambiar's case (AIR 1966 SC 657) (Supra) that Rule 30(1) (b) under which the orders of detention had been passed was invalid on grounds other than those based on Article 14, 19, 21 and 22. This Court held that if that plea was well founded the last clause of the presidential Order was not satisfied and therefore, the bar created by it suspending the citizens' fundamental rights under Articles 14, 21 and 22 could not be pressed into service by the respondent. 86. Articles 79, 85, 86, 100(1) and 105(3) were considered in Nambiar's case (AIR 1966 SC 657) (supra) in relation to rights of Memebrs of Parliament and it was held