268. The concept of democracy as visualized by the Constitution presupposes the representation of the people in Parliament and State Legislatures by the method of election. And, before an election machinery can be brought into operation, there are three requisites which require to be attended to namely, (1) there should be a set of laws and rules making provisions with respect to all matters relating to or in connection with elections, and it should be decided as to how these laws and rules are to be made; (2) there should be an executive charged with the duty of securing the due conduct of elections; and (3) there should be a judicial tribunal to deal with disputes arising out of or in connection with elections. Articles 327 and 328 deal with the first of these requisites, Article 324 with the second and Article 329 with the third requisite (see N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency. (1952) 3 SCR 218 at p. 229 = (AIR 1952 SC 64 at p. 68). 269. Article 329 (b) envisages the challenge to an election by a petition to be presented to such authority as the Parliament may, by law, prescribe. A law relating to election should contain the requisite qualifications for candidates, the method of voting, definition of corrupt practices by the candidates and their election agents, the forum for adjudication of election disputes and other cognate matter. It is on the basis of this law that the question whether there has been a valid election has to be determined by the authority to which the petition is presented. And, when a dispute is raised as regards the validity of the election of a particular candidate the authority entrusted with the task of resolving the dispute must necessarily exercise a judicial function, for, the process consists of ascertaining the facts relating to the election and applying the law to the facts so ascertained. In other words it is obvious that a power must be lodged somewhere to judge the validity of the election for otherwise, there would be no certainty as to who were legitimately chosen as members and any intruder or usurper might claim a seat and thus trample upon the privileges and liberties of the people. Indeed elections would become under such circumstances, a mockery. In whichever authority the power is lodged the nature of the function is such that it requires a judicial approach. It cannot be resolved on considerations of political expediency. 270. It was contended for the appellant that in England, it was the House of Commons which originally decided election disputes concerning its members, that it was only in 1770 that the function was delegated to committees and, therefore. Parliament is the proper forum for deciding election disputes of its members as it is one of its privileges I think, at the time our Constitution was framed the decision of an election dispute had ceased to be a privilege of the House of Commons in England and therefore, under Article 105 (3), it could not be a privilege of Parliament in this country. 271. Before the year 1770 controverted elections were tried and determined by the whole House of Commons as mere party questions upon which the strength of contending factions might be tested “In order to prevent