292. The mere fact that an Act to indemnify A or an Act sanctioning a pension to the Speaker is passed by the House of Commons in England should not lead us conclude that it is law. ‘‘The English Legislature was originally constituted not for legislative but for financial purposes its primary function was, not to make laws, but to grant supplies".* 293. J.C. Carter has said that statute books contain vast masses of matter which, though in the form of laws, are not laws in the proper sense, that these consist in the making of provisions for the maintenance of public works of the State, for the building of asylums hospitals, school buses, and a great variety of similar matter, and that this is but the record of actions of the State in relation to the business in which it is engaged. According to him, the State is a great public corporation which conducts a vast mass of business, and the written provisions for this, though in the form of laws are not essentially different from the minute os ordinary corporate bodies recording their actions.† 294. Walter Bagehot has said: ‘‘An immense mass indeed of the legislation is not in the proper language of jurisprudence legislation at all. A law is a general command applicable to many cases. The ‘special acts' which crowd the statute book and weary parliamentary committes are applicable to one case only. They do not lay down rules acording to which railways shall be made, but enact that such and such a railway shall be made from this place to that place and they have no bearing on any other transaction.’’** 295. ‘‘When the authors of books on jurisprudence write about law, when professional lawyers talk about law, the kind of law about which they are mainly thinking is that which is found in Justinian's Institutes, or in the Napoleone Codes or in the New Civil Code of the German Empire, that is to say, the legal rules which relate to contracts and torts to property, to family relations nad inhritance or else to law of crimes as is to be found in a Penal Code."‡ 296. John Locke was of the view that ‘legislative authority is to act in a particular wasy.... (and) those who yield this authority should make only general rules. They are to govern by promulgated established laws not to be varied in particular cases.‡‡ 297. Perhaps the most exhaustive treatment of the question of the necessity for generality in law is to be found in ‘‘Jurisprudence, Men and Ideas of the Law’’ by Patterson (see Chapter V). According to him, the generality of a law depends upon its being applicable to an indefinite number of human beings and that is the most significant aspect of law. He said that an ordinary judgment of a court is not law as a judgment applies only to a limited number of individuals the parties to the cae. He disagreed with Dr. Kelsen's statement that the judicial decision is an individual legal norm as the expression individual legal norm is a self-contradiciton. 298. To Friedmann the most essential element in the concept of law is a degree of generality: ‘‘The first desideratum of a system for subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules is an obvious one: there must be rules. This may be