which rendered it invalid. Thirdly, the cases cited for the appellant are cases relating to legislative validation of invalid elections or removal of disqualification with retrospective effect. Being cases of legislative validation, or removal of disqualifications by legislature they are not liable to be tested on the basis of the theory of basic structure which, I think, is applicable only to constitutional amendments. Fourthly, there was no controversy in those cases with regard to adjudicative facts: if there was controversy with regard to these facts it is very doubtful whether there could be legislative validation of an election by changing the law alone without ascertaining the adjudicative facts by judicial process. 330. Then I come to the argument of counsel that equality is a basic structure of the Constitution and that that has been damaged or destroyed by Clause (4). 331. The Solicitor General submitted that the majority in Bharati's case (AIR 1973 SC 1461) did not hold that Article 14 pertains to the basic structure that apart from Article 14, there is no principle of equality which is a basic structure of the Constitution and that it is not a chameleon like concept which changes its colour with the nature of the subject-matter to which it is applied. 332. The majority in Bharati's case did not hold that Article 14 pertains to the basic structure of the Constitution. The majority upheld the validity of the first part of Article 31-C; this would show that a constitutional amendment which takes away or abridges the right to challenge the validity of an ordinary law for violating the fundamental right under that Article would not destroy or damage the basic structure. The only logical basis for supporting the validity of Arts. 31-A, 31-B and the first part of 31-C is that Article 14 is not a basic structure. 333. Counsel for the respondent, however, submitted that even if Art. 14 does not pertain to basic structure equality is an essential feature of democracy and rule of law and that Clause (4) by dispensing with the application of the law relating to election petition and matters connected therewith to the appellant and another has made an unreasonable distinction between persons similarly situated and has thereby damaged or destroyed that essential feature and therefore, the clause is bad. He said that in so far as laws are general instructions to act or refrain from acting in certain ways in specified circumstances enjoined upon persons of a specified kind, they enjoin uniform behaviour in identical cases; that to fall under a law is protanto to be assimilated to a single pattern; and that a plea for rule of law in this sense is in essence a plea for life in accordance with laws as opposed to other standards namely, the adhoc dispensation from its operation. He argued that if some persons for no stated reason and in accordance with no rule, obtain exemption from the operation of law, while persons who are sufficiently similar in relevant characteristics are governed by it, that is manifestly unfair, for to allow some persons to do that which is forbidden to all others is irrational.