us to understand what an actual democracy is. In the real word, R. A. Dahl has pointed out that, democracies are 'polyarchies'. The term democracy has not only a descriptive or denotative function but also a normative and persuasive function. Therefore, the problem of defining democracy is two-fold, requiring both a descriptive and prescriptive function. To avoid pitfalls, it is necessary to keep in mind two things – first, that a firm distinction should be made between the is and the ought of democracy, and, second, that the prescriptive and the descriptive definitions of democracy must not be confused, because the democratic ideal does not define the democratic reality and vice versa: the real democracy is not and cannot be the same as the ideal one. * One cannot test the validity of an ordinary law with reference to the essential elements of an ideal democracy. It can be tested only with reference to the principles of democracy actually incorporated in the Constitution. 349. Nor can it be tested on the touchstone of justice. The modern Pilate asks. What is justice? and stays not for an answer. To Hans Kelsen, justice is an irrational ideal, and regarded from the point of rational cognition, he thinks there are only interests and hence conflict of interests. Their solution, according to him, can be brought about by an order that satisfies one interest at the expense of the other or seeks to achieve a compromise between opposing interests. "General Theory of Law and State" 1946, p. 13. Mr. Allen has said that the concept of social justice is vague and indefinite. "Aspects of Justice" p. 31. Liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship are not absolute concepts. They are emotive words. They mean different things to different people. Equality of status and of opportunity are concepts laden with emotional overtones. In their absoluteness they are incapable of actual realisation. The enacting provisions in the body of the Constitution alone give concrete shape to these ideas and it is on the basis of these provisions that the validity of ordinary law should be tested. 350. The democracy which our Constitution-makers established is based on the representation of the people in the law-making organs. The method by which this representation has to be effectuated has been provided in the Constitution. Part XV of the Constitution deals with the topic of elections. Article 326 provides that elections to the House of the people and to the legislative assemblies of State should be on the basis of adult suffrage. Articles 327 and 328 provide for making of laws with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection with, elections to either House of Parliament or to the House or either House of the Legislature of a State including the preparation of electoral rolls, the delimitation of constituencies and all other matters necessary for securing the due constitution of such House or Houses. The validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or the allotment of seats to the constituencies, made or purporting to be made under Article 327 or Article 328 shall not be called in question in any court (see Article 329 (a). 351. This would indicate that the Constitution has entrusted the task of framing the law relating to election to parliament, and, subject to the law made by parliament to the State legislatures. An important branch of the law