rejected by the trial Court. It was ignored by it presumably under an erroneous belief that it was not material. 439. There is no evidence what-soever that Shri Kapur was constituted a sort of general de facto agent of the Prime Minister even before he became her election agent on 1-2-1971. Indeed, such a case that Shri Kapur was constituted a defacto agent of the Prime Minister, and if so, what was the scope of his authority, was not set up in the petition and was not put in issue. Therefore there is no finding on it by the learned Judge. Could the Court then, without any proof of any specific request or solicitation or even knowledge of or consent to the doing of any particular acts Shri Kapur may have done in this period make the Prime Minister liable for them in any way? I think not. The election petitioner had to be confined to the case he had set up. This, as already pointed out could only be on a fair reading of the petition on issue No.1, one of specific authorisation of particular individual acts of Shri Kapur. Of this there is not only no evidence whatsoever on record but the evidence is to the contrary. 440. Issue No. 1 as framed, and the form of findings given on it indicate that the learned Judge realized that the election petitioner's case must be confined to proof of specific acts or statements of the original respondent herself which induced Shri Kapur, as a Government servant to give some assistance in furtherance of her election but the discussion of evidence and the inferences which the learned Judge reached upon the circumstances found indicated that the learned Judge thought that Shri Kapur was constituted a sort of de facto agent even before Shri Kapur was clothed with legal authority on 1-2-1971. This appears to me to be the underlying current of thought and reasoning of the learned Judge. Thus the result was that what was really decided was the case of a defacto agency which was neither set up nor was the subject-matter of an issue. I therefore think that the principle that no amount of evidence could be looked into on a case not really set up was applicable here, it was quite unfair to expect the original respondent to meet a case not set up at all. Furthermore, the case of defacto agency was in the circumstances of the particular case only possible to set up if the Prime Minister had made some request to Shri Kapur to go and conduct the election campaign even before he was appointed her election agent on 1-2-1971. If this was not established by evidence on record, it could be said that the bottom was knocked out of even such a hypothetical case. Had a case of de facto agency been even argued it is not conceivable that certain cases of Division Benches of the Allahabad High Court itself would not have been cited to show on what kind of evidence it could succeed. 441. In Rustom Satin v. Dr. Sampoornanand. (1959) 20 Ele LR 221 at p. 243 (All) it had been held by a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court (V. Bhargava and J.N. Takru. JJ.), inter alia (at p. 243): “So far as the election law in this country is concerned it is a creation of statute and as such has to be interpreted in accordance with the provisions of that statute. Section 100 of the Act clearly refers to corrupt practices