which may by means of a single consolidated order or declaration of law, exercise any or all of them themselves whenever they please whether such powers be executive, legislative, or judicial. Could this be the ambit of ‘‘constituent power’’ in our a Constitution? Would such a view not defeat the whole purpose of Constitution? Does the whole constitution so crumble and melt in the crucible of constituent power that its parts cannot be made out? Before we could accept a view which carries such drastic implications with it we will have overrule the majority view in Kesavananda Bharti’s case (AIR 1973 SC 1461) (supra). The majority view in that case, which is binding upon us, seemed to be that both the supremacy of the Constitution and separation of powers are parts of the basic structure of the Constitution. 524. If ‘‘constituent power’’, by it itself, is so transcendental and exceptional as to be above the provisions of the Constitution itself, it should not, logically speaking, be bound even by the procedure of amendment prescribed by Article 368 (2) I have not found any opinion expressed so far by any learned Judge of this Court to show that the constituent power is not bound by the need to follow the procedure laid down in Article 368 (2) of the Constitution. Indeed, rather inconsistently with the theory of an absolute and unquestionable power in some undifferentiated or raw and unfettered form, operating from above and outside the Constitution, learned Counsel supporting the impugned 4th Clause in the 39th Amendment, concede that the constituent power is bound by the appropriate procedure laid down in Article 368 for the amendment of the Constitution. What they urge is that subject to this procedure, which has been followed here, the constituent power cannot be questioned because it is a ‘‘sovereign power’’. The logical consequence of such an argument also is that the majority view in Kesavananda Bharti’s case (AIR 1973 SC 1461) (supra) was erroneous. It also overlooks that judicial review of laws made by Parliament is always a review of an exercise of ‘‘sovereign power’’. It may be that the object of the learned Counsel in advancing this extraordinary theory was to induce us to refer this case to a much larger bench so that the majority view in Kesavananda Bharti’s case (supra) may, if necessary, be overruled. I, however, doubt whether putting forward such extreme and untenable propositions is the best method of securing such a result. 525. I think that the possible theoretical question indicated above, whatever may be the object of raising it, does deserve to be seriously considered and answered by us because it discloses a basic misconception. Therefore, I propose to consider it at a length which seems to me to be jusified by our need to clarify our thinking on a basic or ‘‘key’’ concept without a final commitment to a particular view on it. Clearer thinking by examining a basic theoretical question from every conceivable angle, leads, I believe, to that openmindedness which is needed by lawyers no less than by any other class today so that we may, contrary to our reputation, be responsive to the inevitable challenges of change. Justice Holmes once said: ‘‘Theory is the most important part of the dogma of law as the architect is the most