Theory of Society" by Otto Gierke translated by Ernest Barker, Vol. I, p. 153) about the approach of Kant : "Kant sketches, indeed, an ideal Constitutional State in which popular sovereignty is nominally present, but no living 'subject' of supreme authority is anywhere really to be found in this State. The 'bearers' of the different powers (legislative, executive and judicial) are supposed to govern, but each is subject to a strict legal obligation appropriate to its own sphere, and over them all, as the Sovereign proper, the abstract Law of Reason is finally enthroned." He concluded (at p. 153) : "The history of the theory of constitutionalism shows how a doctrine derived from the principle of popular sovereignty could produce almost the same results as the other and apparently opposite) system of thought which started from the principle of the sovereignty of the Ruler. In the one case, just as in the other, the inviolability of sovereignty, and the unity of the personality of the State, are sacrificed, in order to attain the possibility of a constitutional law which is binding even on the sovereign." 564. A theory of a "Legal Sovereignty" must necessarily demarcate the sphere of its "legal" or proper operation as opposed to mere use of power either capriciously or divorced from human reason and natural justice. Ernest Barker's statement of it, quoted by me in Kesavananda's case (AIR 1973 SC 1461) (supra), seemed to me to satisfy this requirement. After pointing out that Sovereignty, by which I understand one recognised by law, is limited both by its own "nature" as well as its "mode of action", it concludes: (at pp. 867-868 (of SCR) = (at p. 1973 of AIR)) : "Sovereignty moves within the circle of the legal association, and only within that circle it decides upon questions of a legal order, and only upon those questions. Moving within that circle, and deciding upon those questions, sovereignty will only make legal pronouncements, and it will make them according to regular rules of legal procedure. It is not a capricious power of doing anything in any way : it is a legal power of settling finally legal questions in a legal way." There should be no difficulty in accepting such a theory if one can conceive of an ordered system or "government of laws" as opposed to a "Government of men" placed beyond limitations of this kind. At any rate, it is implicit in the very idea of a Constitution. Our Constitution not only regulates the operations of the organs of State but symbolises the unity of the Republic and contains the inspiring hopes and aspirations and cherished goals of all the efforts of the nation. It operates not merely through the law but also on the minds and feelings of the people. 565. Prof. Willis, in his "Constitutional Law of the United States" advocates the doctrine of "sovereignty of the People" for which he finds support in Abraham Lincoln's well known description of the American system as "a Government of the people, for the people, by the people" as well as in a number of pronouncements of the American Supreme Court. After