expressly laid down mode of doing something necessarily prohibits the doing of that thing in any other manner. The broad general principle is thus summarised in CRAWFORD's "Statutory Constructions" (1940) at p. 334. "Express Mention and Implied Exclusion (Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius) – As a general rule in the interpretation of statutes the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of another thing. I therefore logically follows that if a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate everything else must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect. For instance, if the statute in question enumerates the matters over which a court has jurisdiction no other matters may be included. Similarly, where a statute forbids the performance of certain things only those things expressly mentioned are forbidden. So also if the statute directs that certain acts shall be done in a specified manner or by certain person there perforcance in any other manner than that specified or by any other person than one of those named is impliedly prohibited." 589. It is interesting to note that in the Australian Constitution, where there is Art. 49 using language very similar to that of Art. 105 (3) of our Constitution there is also a separate but differently cast Article 47 of the Australian Constitution corresponding to Art. 329 (b) of our Constitution. This article runs as follows: "Art. 47. Until the Parliament otherwise provides any question respecting the qualification of a senator or of a member of the House of Representatives or respecting a vacancy in either House of the Parliament and any question of a disputed election to either House shall be determined by the House in which the question arises." 590. What is separately expressly and especially provided for by Art. 329 (b) must necessarily fall outside the purview of Art. 105 (3) on the principle stated above. Moreover. Art 105 (3) contained a temporary provision until other provision was made by Parliament in that behalf. Appropriate provisions were enacted by the Act of 1951 in compliance with Art 329 (b) because that was the proper Article for it. It would be idle to contend that these provisions suddenly lapsed or ceased to exist as soon as Parliament took up consideration of the issue and the grounds of the decision on them by the High Court to which reference is made in Art. 329A (4). Again a purported exercise of power in enacting Article 329A(4) could only be a law making power and not any other power which could conceivably fall under Art. 105 sub-art. (3). Nevertheless it was suggested by copious references to the origin of the power of the House of Commons to decide disputes relating to elections that such a power exists in each House of our Parliament as its inherent power. Such an argument completely over looks that, quite apart from the great difference made by providing both the forum and the procedure for deciding election disputes indicated by Art 329 (b) of our Constitution, Article 105 (3) itself could only refer to such powers as were still exercisable by the House of Commons at the time when our Constitution was passed long before that the House of Commons in England had ceased to