members as they had done before the Grenville Act. And for half a century this system with slight variations of procedure was suffered to prevail. In 1839 however the ballot was at length superseded by Sir Robert Peel's Act; committees were reduced to six members and nominated by an impartial body – the General Committee of Elections. The same principle of selection was adhered to in later Acts with additional securities for impartiality and the committee was finally reduced to five members. The evil was thus greatly diminished but still the sinister influence of party was not wholly overcome. In the nomination of election committees, one party or the other necessarily had a majority of one, and though these tribunals undoubtely became far more able and judicial, their constitution and proceedings often exposed them to imputation of political bias.' At length by the statute 31 and 32 Vict. C. 125 the trial of election petitions was transferred to certain of the puisne judges at Westminister who are selected annually to form a rota for this specific purpose; and who inquire upon the spot in open court into the allegations of a petitioner, either claiming a seat, or alleging an undue return or election. The decision of the judge, who has power to reserve his judgment until he has consulted the Common Pleas division of the High Court in which these proceedings are instituted is final to all intents and purposes; the House of Commons being bound to give the necessary directions for confirming or altering the returns or for issuing a writ for a new election or carrying such determination into execution as circumstances may require" And this abstract of the proceedings at elections of knights citizens and burgesses concludes our inquiries into the laws and customs more peculiarly relatvie to the House of Commons." 592. I do not think that it is possible to contend by resorting some concept of a succession to the powers of the medieval "High Court of Parliament" in England that a judicial power also devolved upon our Parliament through the Constituent Assembly, mentioned in Sec. 8 of the Indian Independence Act of 1947. As already indicated by me the Constituent Assembly was invested with law making and not judicial powers. Whatever judicial power may have been possessed once by English King sitting in Parliament constituting the highest Court of the realm in medieval England have devloved solely on the House of Lords as the final court of appeal in England. "King in Prliament" had ceased to exercise judicial powers in any other way long before 1950. And the House of Commons had certainly not exercised a judicial power as a successor to the one time jurisdiction of the "King in Parliament," with the possible exception of the power to punish for its contempts. I use the qualifying word "possible" because the more correct view of it today may be that this power is also as it is considered in America a mere incident of legislative power, necessary for the due performance of law making functions and not an "inheritance". 593. In Erskine May's Parliamentary Practice (18th Edn.) after citing the opinions of Judges to whom a reference was made by the House of Lords in Thorpe's case (1451) that "Lex Parliamenti" seemed something as strange