determine the orbit of a claim to a power as a Parliamentary preserve, on the facts of a case, although, once it is established that the claim is to a power confined to its proper sphere, they will not decide a mere question of its proper exercise. 595. Whatever view one may take of any other powers of Parliament, by reason of Article 105 (3) of the Constitution, I am unable to see how exercise of the jurisdiction to determine an election dispute, which was in accordance with Article 329 (b), already vested in the High Court by the Act of 1951 for all elections to House of the People, could not only be taken away by a Constitutional amendment, purporting to repeal retropectively the provisions of the Act of 1951, a piece of ordinary legislation, in their application to particular class of cases, but at the same time making a declaration of the rights of the parties to a judgment, without first performing a judicial funciton also which was not included in the "constituent" or any other law making power. 596. The question was not clearly raised before us whether a Constitutional amendment could partially repeal the provision of an ordinary piece of legislation, that is to say the Act of 1951, in so far as its application to a certain class of cases is concerned. One of the submissions of the learned Counsel for the election petitioner, however, was that inasmuch as the Constitution lays down the norms to which ordinary legislation must conform, its proper sphere of operation is different from that of ordinary legislation which takes place under the provision of Articles 245 to 255 of the Constitution. The argument seemed to be, that if ordinary law making and constitution making took place in different orbits or on different place of law making power what could be done by one method was necesarily prohibited by the other. Learned Counsel relied upon a number of passages from the judgment in Kesavananda Bharti's case (AIR 1973 SC 1461) (supra), and, in particular, on what Ray, J., (as he then was) said (at p. 386) (of SCR) = (at p 1688 of AIR): "The constituent power is sui generis. The majority view in Golak Nath case (AIR 1967 SC 1643) that Article 13 (2) prevails over Article 368 was on the basis that there was no distinction between constituent and legislative power and an amendment of the Constitution was law and that such law attracted the opening words of Article 245 which in its -turn attracted the provisions of Article 13 (2). Parliament took notice of the two conflicting views which had been taken of the unamended Article 368, took notice of the fact that the prepondering judicial opinion, namely, the decision in Shankari Prasad case, Saijan Singh case and the minority views of five learned Judges in Golak Nath case were in favour of the view that Article 368 contained the power of amendment and that power was the constituent power belonging to Parliament. Wanchoo, J., rightly said in Golak Nath case that the power under Article 368 is a constituent power to change the fundamental law, that is to say, the Constitution and is distinct from ordinary legislative power. So long as this distinction is kept in mind Parliament will have power under Article 368 to amend the Constitution and what Parliament does under