Art 329A necessarily involved as a condition precedent to the making of the declaration found at the end of it, the performance of a quasi-judicial or judicial function. But, I do not think that we could go so far as that. The Act of 1951, enacted under the provisions of Article 329 (b) of the Constitution provided a procedure which could not be circumvented. This procedure was certainly applicable until 10-8-1975 when the 39th Amendment received Presidential assent. Rights of appeal under Section 116A of the Act having been invoked by the Original Respondent as well as by the election petitioner and the operation of the Hight Court's order having been suspended, the positin was in the eyes of law that the election dispute was continued by a proceeding, exclusively prescribed by article 329 (b) for the resolution of the dispute, pending in this Court. I do not think, that despite the impression created by the terms of the declaration at the end of clause (4) of Article 329A and the opening statement of the counsel for the original respondent we can assume that Parliament took over the case into its own hands to decide it and to incorporate the result in the form of Article 329A(4) so that this may take the place of a possible judgment of this Court. Parliament could not be deemed to be unaware of the bar created by Article 329 (b) and the 1951 Act. 601. At one stage, counsel supporting the 39th amendment said that the norms of the Act of 1951 together with the amendment of the Act in 1974 and the very recent ones of 1975 must have been present in the minds of members of Parliament and applied to the facts of the case. Such a contention, apart from overlooking the effect of the bar of Art 329 (b) which operated against the case being taken up in Parliament directly until at least 10--8-1975, just as Section 107 of the British Representation of People Act, 1949, operates against the adoptin of such a course in England, overlooked the legal effect of the deeming provision which, if valid would repeal such a submission of counsel supporting the 39th amendment. The deeming provision appeared to be quite sweeping. It said : "No law made by Parliament before the commencement of the Constitution (Thirtyninth Amendment) Act. 1975, in so far as it relates to eletion petitions and matters connected therewith shall apply or shal be deemed ever to have applied to or in relation to the election of any such person as is referred to in clause (1) to either House of Parliament" 602. The effect of such a provision is thus stated in the oft quoted passage from East End Dwellings Co. Ltd. v. Finsbury Borough Council (1952) AC 109; “If you are bidden to treat an imaginary state of affairs as real, you must surely, unless prohibited from doing so, also imagine as real the consequences and incidents which, if the putative state of affairs had in fact existed, must inevitably have flowed from or accompanied it ............. The statute says that you must imagine a certain state of affairs, it does not say that having done so, you must cause or permit your imagination to boggle when it comes to the inevitable corollaries of that state of affairs.”