quam pereat. It is true that the deeming provision seems to stand in the way of our examination of the merits of the case even though there is no direct provision taking away our jurisdiction to consider the merits of the appeals before us. It has, however, been repeatedly laid down that a deeming provision introducing a legal fiction must be confined to the context of it and cannot be given a larger effect: (See Radha Kishan v. Durga Parsed, AIR 1940 PC 167). In Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. The State of Bihar (1955) 2 SCR 603 = (AIR 1955 SC 661) it was held by this Court that a legal fiction is created for some definite purposes and should not be extended beyond its legitimate field determined by its context. The same view has been expressed by this Court in other cases; C.I.T. Bombay v. James Anderson; (1964) 5 SCR 590 = (AIR 1964 SC 1761) C.I.T., Madras v. Express Newspaper Ltd., Madras; (1964) 8 SCR 189 = (AIR 1965 SC 33); Sri Jagdguru Kari Basava Rajendraswami of Govimutt v. Commissioner of Hindu Religious Charitable Endowments, Hyderabad. (1964) 8 SCR 252 = (AIR 1965 SC 502). 634. In Ex-Parte Walton, In re: Levy, (1881) 17 Ch D. 746 James LJ said: "When a statue enacts that something shall be deemed to have been done, which in fact and in truth was not done, then the court is entitled and bound to ascertain for what purposes and between what persons the statutory fiction is to be resorted to?" In other words, we have to examine the context and the purpose of the legal fiction and confine its effects to these. 635. If the purpose of the clause (4) of Article 329A was purely meet the political needs of the country and was only partly revealed by the policy underlying the statement of objects and reasons it seems possible to contend that it was not intended at all to oust the jurisdiction of the Court, Hence, Art. 329A cl. (5) will not, so understood, bar the jurisdiction of the Court to hear and decide the appeals when it says that the appeal shall be disposed of in conformity with the provisions of clause (4). 636. In the circumstances of this case, it would seem that conformity with the declaration embodied in Article 329A clause (4) is possible, if we confine the meaning and effect of the deeming provision to what was needed only for the declaration to be given at the end of clause (4) by the constituent bodies, with a political object, and not for the purposes of affecting our jurisdiction which determines legal effects or what is sought to be done. Of course, the more natural interpretation would appear to be that the deeming provision should apply for all purposes including those for consideration of the appeals before us. But if it is not possible to decide those appeals without giving a different meaning to the deeming provision, on which the final declaration in clause (4) rests, and clause (5) leaves us free to decide how we could conform with clause (4) need our jurisdiction to decide factual and legal issues judicially be said to be affected? If the fiction was only a logical step in the process of the declaration to be made by constituent authorities but not of ours, it would only attach to the declaration contained at the end of clause (4). Perhaps it could be argued, by applying the doctrine of "reading down", that clause (4) was not intended to oust the jurisdiction of this Court