Laws which were in force prior to August 10, 1975. (iv) The election shall not be deemed ever to have become void on any ground on which prior to August 10, 1975 it was declared to be void. (v) The election shall continue to be valid in all respects notwithstanding the judgment of any court which includes the judgment dated June 12, 1975 of the High Court of Allahabad. (vi) The judgment of the Allahabad High Court and any finding on which the judgment and order of that court is based are void and shall be deemed always to have been void. 662. Shri Shanti Bhushan has as it were a preliminary objection to the 39th Amendment that the election of a private individual and the dispute concerning it cannot ever be a matter of Constitutional amendment. Whether this contention is sound is another matter but I do not see the force of the argument of the Attorney-General that in view of the decisions in Sankari Prasad's case. Sajjan Singh's case and the Fundamental Rights case the contention is not upon to be taken. The question raised by Shri Shanti Bhushan was not raised or considered in either of the three aforesaid cases and I do not see how the question can be shelved. The argument is not a new facet of the theory of inherent of implied limitations on the amending power in which case it might have been plausible to contend that the last word was said on the subject by the Full Court in the Fundamental Rights case. The question now raised touches a totally new dimension of the amending power : Can the Constituent Assembly while amending the Constitution pronounce upon private disputes or must it only concern itself with what may be termed organisational matters concerning the country's governance? The question has the merit of novelty but I see no substance in it. But I must clarify that I prefer to examine the point in isolation that is divocered from considerations arising from the theory of separation of powers. Whether the amendment constitutes an encroachment on judicial functions and thereby damages one of the basic structures of the Constitutions may best be examined separately. The reason why I see no substance in Shri Shanti Bhushan's contention is that what the Constitution ought to contain is not for the Courts to decide. The touchstone of the validity of a Constitutional amendment is firstly whetter the procedure prescribed by Article 368 is strictly complied with and secondly whether the amendment destroys or damages the basic structure of the Constitution. The subject-matter of constitutional amendments is a question of high policy and Courts are concerned with the interpretation of laws, not with the wisdom of the policy underlying them. I do not see why the Constitution cannot be amended so as to provide that wagering contracts shall be void or that bigamous marriages shall be unlawful or that economic offenders shall be visited with a higher penalty. The Indian Constitution is not like the American Constitution an instrument of few words. The range of topics it covers would bemuse any student of foreign Constitutions which do not even skirt the problems with which our Constitution deals in copious details. In fact there is hardly any important facet of national life which our Constitution does not touch. Along with matters of high priority like citizenship, Fundamental Rights, Directive Principles of State Policy and the