(See Kanta Kathuria v. Manak Chand Surana, (1970) 2 SCR 835 = (AIR 1970 SC 694). 41. Our Federal Court in Basanta Chandra Ghose v. The King Emperor, 1944 FCR 295 = (AIR 1944 FC 86) dealt with the validity and effect of Ordinance No. 3 of 1944. One of the objects of that Ordinance was to enact a presumption in the Ordinance itself in favour of detention orders to preclude their being questioned in courts of law and to take away or limit the power of the High Court to make orders under S. 491 of the Cri. P.C. The third object of the Ordinance was challenged on the ground that Section 10 (2) of the Ordinance which provided that if at the commencement there is pending in any Court any proceeding by which the validity of an order having effect by virtue of Section 6 as if it had been made under this Ordinance is called in question that proceeding is hereby discharged. Section 10 (2) of the Ordinance was challenged on the ground that this was in abrogation of judicial power by legislative authority. it was said that the legislative authority only passed the law and the disposal of the particular case could remain the function of the court. Section 10 (2) of the Ordinance was said not to leave it to the court to apply the rule of law to the decision of cases but to discharge all pending procedings. Our Federal Court noticed the distinction between a legislative act and the judicial act, and said "a direction such a proceding is discharged is clearly a judicial act and not an enactment of law". In piare Dusadh's case (AIR 1944 FC 1) (supra) the latter Ordinance provided that the decisions of the earlier Tribunals which were negatived by a decision of the Federal Court should be treated as decisions of duly constituted Tribunals. That was held not to constitute a judicial power by the Ordiance making authoriy. In Basanta Chandra Ghose's case (supra) the Federal Court held Section 10 (2) of the Ordiance to be a direct disposal of cases by the legislature itself. Basanta Chandra Ghose's case (supra) was decided on the ground that the section in the Ordinance discharged the procedings. There was nothing left to the Court. 42. Counsel on behalf of the respondent contended taht the constituent power could deal with amendments of the Consitution, but could not exercise constituent power in relation to validating an election. 43. Judicial Review is one of the distinctive features of the American Constitutional Law. In America equal protection of the laws is based on the concept of due process of law. These features are not in our Constitution. 44. In Bond's case (1966) 17 L Ed 2d 235 (supra) the House claimed additional power to disqualify a member on grounds other than those stated in the Constitution. It was conceded there as it will appear at page 244 of the Report that judicial review against the disqualification decreed by the House would be available if a member was excluded on racial ground or other unconstitutional grounds. The House claimed that the ground on which Bond was disqualified was not an unconstitutional ground. The court held that there was no distinction between a disqualification decreed by the House on racial grounds and one alleged to violate the right of free speech. The court concluded that Bond was deprived of his constitutional rights guaranteed by the First Amendment by the disqualification decreed by the House. This was not a case of deciding an election dispute by the House and the Court sitting on appeal on the decision of the House. This is a case where a disqualification was imposed on unconstitutional grounds, thereby affecting