King v. Whitmer CIVIL 20-13134 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2021) they were “not in a position to respond to [the State Defendants'] request until [the] appeals [before the Sixth Circuit and United States Supreme Court] are decided, ” and noted that “[they] do not believe the district court has jurisdiction to consider [the State Defendants'] motion while the case is on appeal.” (Id.) Of course, because neither this Court, the Sixth Circuit, nor the United States Supreme Court had entered a stay-and Plaintiff had not moved for one in any court-this Court retained its jurisdiction to consider the Motion to Dismiss. See Zundel v. Holder, 687 F.3d 271, 282 (6th Cir. 2012) (“[A]n appeal from an order granting or denying a But the portion of the Big Yank opinion cited discusses a court's inherent authority to sanction, not sanctions under § 1927 as pursued by the State Defendants. Plaintiffs' counsel's contention as to the three remaining cases- Salkil, 458 F.3d 520, Jones, 789 F.2d 1225, and In re Ruben, 825 F.2d 1225-are plainly meritless and worthy of no further discussion. (See ECF No. 112 at Pg ID 4627-29.) The Court finds that Plaintiffs' counsel unreasonably and vexatiously multiplied the proceedings in this case and their arguments to the contrary are unavailing. B. Whether Plaintiffs' Counsel Violated Rule 11 preliminary injunction does not divest the district court of jurisdiction to proceed with the action on the merits.”) And for some reason, Plaintiffs eventually voluntarily dismissed this lawsuit while it remained on appeal in the Sixth Circuit and Supreme Court, even though they previously refused 1. Whether Plaintiffs' counsel submitted claims, defenses, or other legal contentions not warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law in violation of Rule 11(b)(2) to concur as to Defendants' motions to dismiss because it was on appeal in those courts. Finally, Plaintiffs' attorneys contend that the facts and outcome of several cases cited by the State Defendants in support of § 1927 sanctions are distinguishable. (ECF No. 112 at Pg ID 4627-32.) Plaintiffs' attorneys distinguish Ridder because there, unlike here, “an attorney pursued . . . a claim for five years without offering any evidence.” (Id. at Pg ID 4629.) But this does not matter: Forcing Defendants and IntervenorDefendants to file any pleading or brief at any point after Plaintiffs' claims became moot required them to file one pleading or brief too many. Andretti, 426 F.3d at 835. Plaintiffs' attorneys also take issue with the State Defendants' use of Big Yank, pointing out that the court stated- according to Plaintiffs' counsel-that “the bad faith exception requires that the district court make actual findings of fact that demonstrate that the claims were . . . pursued for an improper purpose.” (ECF No. 112 at Pg ID 4630 (citing Big Yank, 125 F.3d at 314).) a) Counsel's presentment of claims not warranted by existing law or a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law The Court said it before and will say it again: At the inception of this lawsuit, all of Plaintiffs' claims were barred by the doctrines of mootness, laches, and standing, as well as Eleventh Amendment immunity. (See ECF No. 62 at Pg ID 3302-24.) Further, Plaintiffs' attorneys did not provide a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law to render their claims ripe or timely, to grant them standing, or to avoid Eleventh Amendment immunity. The same can be said for Plaintiffs' claims under the Elections and Electors, Equal Protection, and Due Process Clauses, and the alleged violations of the Michigan Election Code.28 Finally, the attorneys have not identified any authority that would enable a federal court to grant the relief sought in this lawsuit. 22