OCTOBER TERM, 1961.
Opinion of the Court.
369 U. S.
fication of the issues presently confronting us demands
clear exposition of the grounds upon which the District
Court rested in dismissing the case. The dismissal order
recited that the court sustained the appellees' grounds
"(1) that the Court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, and (2) that the complaint fails to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted ....
In the setting of a case such as this, the recited grounds
embrace two possible reasons for dismissal:
First: That the facts and injury alleged, the legal
bases invoked as creating the rights and duties relied
upon, and the relief sought, fail to come within that language of Article III of the Constitution and of the jurisdictional statutes which define those matters concerning
which United States District Courts are empowered to act;
Second: That, although the matter is cognizable and
facts are alleged which establish infringement of appellants' rights as aresult of state legislative action departing from a federal constitutional standard, the court will
not proceed because the matter is considered unsuited to
judicial inquiry or adjustment.
We treat the first ground of dismissal as "lack of jurisdiction of the subject matter." The second we consider
to result in a failure to state a justiciable cause of action.
The District Court's dismissal order recited that it was
issued in conformity with the court's per curiam opinion.
The opinion reveals that the court rested its dismissal
upon lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and lack of a
justiciable cause of action without attempting to distinguish between these grounds. After noting that the
plaintiffs challenged the existing legislative apportionment
in Tennessee under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses, and summarizing the supporting allegations
and the relief requested, the court stated that
"The action is presently before the Court upon the
defendants' motion to dismiss predicated upon three