OCTOBER TERM, 1961.
Opinion of the Court.
369 U. S.
(rent control) yet not central to the emergency effort.8 9
Further, clearly definable criteria for decision may be
available. In such case the political question barrier falls
away: "[A] Court is not at liberty to shut its eyes to an
obvious mistake, when the validity of the law depends
upon the truth of what is declared. . . . [It can]
inquire whether the exigency still existed upon which the
continued operation of the law depended." Chastleton
Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U. S. 543, 547-548.40 . Compare
Woods v. Miller Co., 333 U. S. 138. On the other hand,
even in private litigation which directly implicates no
feature of separation of powers, lack of judicially discoverable standards and the drive for even-handed application may impel reference to the political departments'
determination of dates of hostilities' beginning and ending. The Protector,12 Wall. 700.
Validity of enactments: In Coleman v. Miller, supra,
this Court held that the questions of how long a proposed
amendment to the Federal Constitution remained open to
ratification, and what effect a prior rejection had on a
subsequent iatification, were committed to congressional
resolution and involved criteria of decision that necessarily escaped the judicial grasp. 1 Similar considerations
apply to the enacting process: "The respect due to coequal
and independent departments," and the need for finality
and certainty about the status of a statute contribute to
judicial .reluctance to inquire whether, as passed, it complied with all requisite formalities. Field v. Clark, 143
U. S. 649, 672, 676-677; see Leser v. Garnett, 258 U. S.
130, 137. But it is not true that courts will never delve
89 Contrast Martin v. Mott, supra.
40 But cf. Dakota Central Tel. Co. v. South Dakota, 250 U. S. 163,
184, 187.
41 Cf. Dillon v.
Gloss, 256 U. S. 368.
Sprague, 282 U. S. 716, 732.
See also United States v.