4 Supreme Court, Court of Appeal and High Court judges, as well as other judicial officers and court administrators on EDR. The JCE has also carried out engagements with the IEBC and the PPDT as part of its institutional collaboration to ensure that the EDR process flows smoothly. 1.4.4. The JCE also engaged in a process of review of its rules to address concerns raised during the 2017 EDR process. Only minor amendments to the Rules were adopted, some of which were necessitated with the need to harmonise the Rules with the Practice Guidelines issued in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. 1.4.5. The JCE also embarked on developing a case management system that is aligned with EDR processes to facilitate the filing and management of election petitions. 1.5. Background 1.5.1. Kenya has had frequent elections since independence. However, the electoral framework did not correspond with enhanced democracy or constitutionalism. Elections were considered the focal point of constitutional regression and attracted significant changes between 1964 and 1992. These changes were largely considered to have contributed to systemic state failure, which triggered the 2007 post-election violence. Kenya’s 2010 Constitution and the statutory feforms following constitutional enactment, therefore, sought to comprehensively reform the electoral framework. 1.5.2. As Kenya prepares for the third general election under the 2010 Constitution, EDR has evolved as a central element in the electoral process. The principles set out under the Constitution have been applied and refined in the two electoral cycles in 2013 and 2017. The resolution of electoral disputes in Kenya was previously defined by inordinate delays and the elevation of legal and procedural technicalities over substantive justice. Three notorious examples, among countless others, indicate the courts’ past obsession with legal and procedural technicalities. First, the courts often struck out election petitions for want of personal service, even where such service was unduly difficult or impractical (Kibaki v Moi (No. 3) [2008] 2 KLR (EP) 351; Mohamed v Bakari & 2 Others [2008] 3 KLR (EP) 54). Secondly, the courts often struck out election petitions for want of personal signature by the petitioner, even where the petitioner suffered a disability that made it impossible to sign or had delegated the signing to a duly authorised agent (Moi v Matiba & 2 Others [2008] 1 KLR (EP) 622; Jahazi v Cherogony [2008] 1 KLR (EP) 273). Thirdly, the courts struck out election petitions for want of locus standi or personal interest, even where the petitioner had a discernible interest in the conduct of the election (Odinga & 3 Others v Chesoni & Another [2008] 1 KLR (EP) 432). The Supreme Court has summarised the courts’ past approach to EDR as follows: For many years, the courts were part of the problems impeding electoral justice, where potential petitioners were unable to serve their powerful opponents, or where they did, files would mysteriously disappear or reappear after the required filing deadlines had already passed. These issues are well documented in several reports by the International Commission of Jurists (Kenya) and other election monitoring groups, where they list the judicial system in this country, in the past, as having committed several electoral injustices, including courts insisting that Petitions must be personally signed by the Petitioner; where the Court held that a petition must be served personally upon the Respondent…; or courts requiring high security for costs to the detriment of those who are unable to raise this amount; or courts taking inordinate amount of time BENCH BOOK ON ELECTORAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION