23 possible moment (Lemanken Aramat v Harun Meitamei Lempaka & 2 Others, Supreme Court Petition No. 5 of 2014). 2.1.7. Furthermore, jurisdictional issues are not procedural elements that can be excused through the invocation of Article 159(2)(d). Consequently, the Court or tribunal cannot exercise jurisdiction that it does not have (Jasbir Singh Rai & 3 Others v Tarlochan Singh Rai Estate of & 4 Others, Supreme Court Petition No. 4 of 2012). 2.2 Timelines 2.2.1 The jurisdiction of a court or tribunal to entertain an electoral dispute often depends on whether the complainant or petitioner has lodged the dispute within the timelines prescribed by law. The EDR timelines prescribed under the Constitution and the Elections Act, 2011— especially those relating to filing and service of election petitions and appeals from decisions of election courts—are inflexible and inextensible (Lemanken Aramat v Harun Meitamei Lempaka & 2 Others, Supreme Court Petition No. 5 of 2014; Mary Wambui Munene v Peter Gichuki King’ara & 2 Others, Supreme Court Petition No. 7 of 2014; Evans Odhiambo Kidero & 4 Others v Ferdinand Ndung’u Waititu & 4 Others, Supreme Court Petition No. 18 of 2014; and Martha Wangari Karua v IEBC & 3 Others, Supreme Court Petition No. 3 of 2019). The rationale for this rule lies in the constitutional requirement of timely resolution of electoral disputes (Article 87(1) of the Constitution). The African Union has similarly affirmed that the establishment and strengthening of national mechanisms that redress election-related disputes in a timely manner is key for transparent, free, fair and democratic elections (Article 17(2) of the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance). 2.2.2 Timelines in electoral disputes is a constitutional principle as it underpins the ability of the people to exercise their sovereignty under Article 1. 2.2.3 Courts, therefore, strictly enforce requirements relating to prescribed timelines in EDR. In Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 Others, Supreme Court Petition No. 2B of 2014, the Supreme Court explained the historical context and rationale for the strict enforcement of EDR timelines in the following terms: This provision [i.e., Article 87(1) of the Constitution] must be viewed against the country’s electoral history. Fresh in the memories of the electorate are those times of the past, when election petitions took as long as five years to resolve, making a complete mockery of the people’s franchise, not to mention the entire democratic experiment…It is now a constitutional imperative that the electorate should know with finality, and within reasonable time, who their representatives are. The people’s will, in [the] name of which elections are decreed and conducted, should not be held captive to endless litigation. 2.2.4 Similarly, in Martha Wangari Karua v IEBC & 3 Others, Supreme Court Petition No. 3 of 2019, the Supreme Court held that: Section 75 undoubtedly derives its authority from Article 87 of the Constitution which requires timely resolution of electoral disputes. We have already explained why there was a need to provide for defined timelines for settling electoral disputes. As such, we hold and maintain our position that once an election petition is filed at the High Court sitting as the Election Court, it must be determined within a period of 6 months. The courts, therefore, are hesitant to uphold legislation or conduct that tends to undermine the constitutional objective of timely resolution of electoral disputes (Raila Odinga v IEBC & 3 Others, Supreme Court Petition No. 5 of 2013; Paul Posh Aborwa v IEBC & 2 Others, Kisumu Civil Appeal No. 52 of 2013; BENCH BOOK ON ELECTORAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION