Cite as: 585 U. S. ____ (2018) 5 Per Curiam On top of this time constraint was the legal uncertainty surrounding any potential remedy for the plaintiffs’ asserted injury. At the time the District Court made its decision, the appeal in Gill was pending before this Court. The District Court recognized that our decision in Gill had the potential to “shed light on critical questions in this case” and to set forth a “framework” by which plaintiffs’ claims could be decided and, potentially, remedied. 266 F. Supp. 3d, at 815–816. In the District Court’s view, “charging ahead” and adjudicating the plaintiffs’ claims in that fluctuating legal environment, when firmer guidance from this Court might have been forthcoming, would have been a mistake. Id., at 816. Such a determination was within the sound discretion of the District Court. Given the District Court’s decision to wait for this Court’s ruling in Gill before further adjudicating plaintiffs’ claims, the court reasonably could have concluded that a preliminary injunction would have been against the public interest, as an injunction might have worked a needlessly “chaotic and disruptive effect upon the electoral process,” Fishman, supra, at 1330, and because the “purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held,” University of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U. S. 390, 395 (1981). In these particular circumstances, we conclude that the District Court’s decision denying a preliminary injunction cannot be regarded as an abuse of discretion. The order of the District Court is Affirmed.