2
BENISEK v. LAMONE
Per Curiam
motion and stayed further proceedings pending this
Court’s disposition of partisan gerrymandering claims in
Gill v. Whitford, No. 16–1161. 266 F. Supp. 3d 799. The
District Court found that plaintiffs had failed to show a
likelihood of success on the merits sufficient to warrant a
preliminary injunction. Id., at 808–814. The District
Court also held that it was “in no position to award
[p]laintiffs the remedy they . . . requested on the timetable
they . . . demanded.” Id., at 815. The court explained
that, notwithstanding its “diligence in ruling on the pending preliminary injunction motion (which has been a
priority for each member of this panel),” plaintiffs’ proposed August deadline for injunctive relief had “already
come and gone.” Ibid.
In addition, the District Court emphasized that it was
concerned about “measuring the legality and constitutionality of any redistricting plan in Maryland . . . according to
the proper legal standard.” Id., at 816. In the District
Court’s view, it would be “better equipped to make that
legal determination and to chart a wise course for further
proceedings” after this Court issued a decision in Gill.
Ibid. Plaintiffs ask this Court to vacate the District
Court’s order and remand for further consideration of
whether a preliminary injunction is appropriate.
We now note our jurisdiction and review the District
Court’s decision for an abuse of discretion, keeping in
mind that a preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary
remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 555 U. S. 7, 24 (2008). As
a matter of equitable discretion, a preliminary injunction
does not follow as a matter of course from a plaintiff ’s
showing of a likelihood of success on the merits. See id., at
32. Rather, a court must also consider whether the movant has shown “that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance
of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in