10 Official Journal – Issue No. 22 (bis) on 03 June 2013 express their opinions, select their leaders and representatives in managing the country's affairs, forming parliamentary councils. Hence, the citizens' practice of their political rights, of which candidacy and election rights are in particular the most important features and applications, either as voters enjoying the right to select their candidates based upon out of conviction about their ability to express the issues that concern them or as candidates contesting, pursuant to fair rules, to win the seats they compete therefor. Hence, the legislator's practice of his discretionary authority in regulating these rights is subject to the limits and regulations set out by the constitutional declaration and so that he may not invoke the organization of the electoral process, wither in respect with its time, place or the way it will be managed, to infringe the rights which the constitutional declaration connected therewith, which would hinder its essence, detract from it, affect its existence or include the waste or confiscation thereof. Whereas based on the case law of this court, the principle of equality before the law – stated by article (7) of the aforesaid constitutional declaration – is neither an inflexible leading principle contrary to the practical necessity, a hard rule that denounces all forms of discrimination nor a guarantee of the arithmetic accuracy required by the absolute justice balances among things. Should the state may take the measures it finds appropriate to regulate a specific subject, avoid an evil that should be combated and should replacing the greater harm by a lesser harm is a necessity, its application of equality principle may neither reveal its impulsive acts, be a predictor of embracing inequitable stances that raises rancours which result in breaking the rules of the behavior thereof nor may it be an aggression against the strength of its power, its stance should be moderate in dealing with the citizens. It should not discriminate among them either by dictation or forcibly. Accordingly, the legislative authority may, according to rational standards, not differentiate among positions of which the givens neither combine nor contrast in the foundations upon which they are based; provided that the discrepancies among them are real, with no fabrication or imagination, based on the grounds that what protects equality principle and does not lessen its content is that organization which establishes a legislative division where the legal texts it includes relates to the legitimate purposes it seeks. If the evidence is based upon the separation of these texts from their purposes, discrimination is an unconsidered disorder. The same thing happens if the relevance of the means to the objectives is inappropriate. At this point, discrimination is considered based upon facts that it cannot be attributed to, thus it becomes constitutionally legitimate. Whereas, the content of the equal opportunity principle, which is a branch of equality principle, and is considered one of its elements, is connected to, based on the case law of this court, the opportunities which the state pledges to offer and whereas its enforcement takes place when competing for such opportunities and the constitutional protection of those opportunities aims at determining priority according to objective bases necessary for public interest. Whereas political system in Arab Republic of Egypt based on multi-partisan system, under the 1971 constitution, which confirmed in Article (4) of the constitutional declaration – it’s intended to turn away from the single popular system to the multipartisan system to build state political system on it, taking into consideration that the multi-party system’s main goal is to deepen democracy and to lay its foundations in the framework of the right to election and candidacy, which are considered an