option that limits the Charter protection least. The question for the reviewing court is always whether the decision falls within a range of reasonable outcomes (Doré, at para. 57; Loyola, at para. 41, citing RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), 1995 CanLII 64 (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199, at para. 160). However, if there was an option or avenue reasonably open to the decisionmaker that would reduce the impact on the protected right while still permitting him or her to sufficiently further the relevant statutory objectives, the decision would not fall within a range of reasonable outcomes. This is a highly contextual inquiry. [59] This is consistent with Opitz v Wrzesnewskyj, 2012 SCC 55, where the Supreme Court states that while enfranchisement is a cornerstone of the CEA, it is not a free-standing right and (para 38) and neither the CEA nor the Charter guarantee unrestricted participation in elections (Figueroa at paras 25 and 36). [60] Accordingly, the CEO did not have to arrive at a decision that perfectly balances Charter values against his statutory mandate. What the CEO was required to do was consider the exercise of his discretion as “an option or avenue reasonably open” to him that would reduce the impact on the Applicants’ Charter rights and still allow the CEO to further the relevant statutory objectives. This is the contextual assessment and the balancing exercise that was to be undertaken by the CEO and that the Court looks for when assessing the reasonableness of the resulting decision. As noted however, there is a lack of evidence on the record to demonstrate that the CEO undertook the requisite proportionate balancing of the Charter infringements with the objectives of the CEA. [61] On judicial review, this Court does not conduct a de novo review of this balancing exercise, but rather reviews whether the balancing was reasonable (Doré, at paras 45 and 51). 2019 FC 964 (CanLII) Page: 20