confuse the nature of the organ with the nature of the function it exercises in the case of the impeachment of judges. Furthermore, when characterizing the “political control” to which he refers, Aragón cites examples such as that exercised by the electoral body, or that carried out by parliament, or the government over the local entities or the autonomous communities; without referring to the specific element of “impeachment” at any time. 94 74. Impeachment takes its inspiration historically from the institution of impeachment in the 1787 Constitution of the United States of America (Article I, section III, paragraph c), according to which the federal Senate “shall try all impeachments” of senior officials of the three branches of Government for political offenses, especially of the federal Constitution. The judgment only entails the removal from office and disqualification from holding office of the official in question. However, since the United States Constitution protects the tenure of federal judges (Article III, section 1), this has taken away its incentive to act against the Judiciary when it is recalled that the records show that it has only tried twice, unsuccessfully, to impeach a federal judge.95 In this regard, it is interesting to recall the characteristics attributed to the Senate in El Federalista LXV when it acts in an impeachment proceeding, which are those of the “judicial nature of the Senate” 96 and of an “independent and impartial court.”97 75. Meanwhile, Joseph Story, when commenting on the United States Constitution, and addressing the issue of impeachment began his reflection with the following eloquent words: “The great objects, to be attained in the selection of a tribunal for the trial of impeachments, are, impartiality, integrity, intelligence, and independence. If either of these is wanting, the trial must be radically imperfect. To ensure impartiality, the body must be in some degree removed from popular power and passions, from the influence of sectional prejudice, and from the more dangerous influence of mere party spirit.” 98 76. Furthermore, the jurisdictional nature of the function exercised by Congress in impeachment proceedings does not infringe the separation of powers, because it does not prevent one branch of power from exercising functions that, in principle, correspond to another. As Loewenstein explains, this is an exceptional case in which Congress exercises judicial functions.99 77. Meanwhile, a contemporary understanding of impeachment should consider it to be a real “constitutional guarantee” in the actual conception of constitutional procedural law.100 The only way to understand the “control” exercised by Congress by means of this proceeding is in a sense that accords with the constitutional rule of law; that is, as a vehicle 94 Aragón, Manuel, op. cit., pp. 173-174. The last time that a federal judge was subjected to impeachment was long ago, in 1805. Cf. Artola, Miguel, Constitucionalismo en la historia, Barcelona, Ed. Crítica, 2005, pp. 252-253. 95 96 Hamilton, A., Madison, J. and Jay, J., op. cit., pp. 277. 97 Ibidem, p. 278. Story, Joseph, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States, Cambridge/Boston, 1833, Volume II, Chapter X: The Senate, para. 743 98 Loewenstein, Karl, Teoría de la Constitución, translated by Alfredo Gallego Anabitarte, Barcelona, Ariel, 2ª ed., 1976, p. 297. 99 Fix-Zamudio, Héctor, Estudio de la defensa de la Constitución en el ordenamiento mexicano, 2ª ed., México, Porrúa/UNAM, 2011, p. 191; Ferrer Mac-Gregor, Eduardo, Panorámica del derecho procesal constitucional and convencional, Madrid, Marcial Pons-UNAM, 2013. 100 19