that impeachment is an exceptional mechanism for the removal of judges, the exceptional nature of which seeks to protect them against undue removal, it is only fitting to continue the jurisprudential line of the ICourtHR, in the sense that, in the exercise of its function, Congress must act independently and impartially and provide the person impeached with the guarantees of due process. To the contrary, what, in principle, sought to be a guarantee of judicial independence — an exceptional proceeding for removal on limited grounds – may become a mechanism at the service of the Government in power to control or to intimidate the Judiciary.106 Expert witness Despouy had a similar opinion, when he indicated that “[when] a political entity exercises jurisdictional functions […], there is a greater risk that the basic principles of due process will be violated; hence, international jurisprudence requires the guarantee of tenure, or that the decisions are made, above all, based on predetermined grounds that are reasoned; the decisions must be well-founded; the reasons must evidently be serious because, to the contrary, [a judge] could be removed for conduct that has no significance from the point of view of his performance.”107 81. As one sector of legal doctrine has recognized, the possibility that Congress may remove judges for very lax criteria and without the appropriate guarantees of due process, jeopardizes the faculty of the courts to exercise the control of constitutionality – and we should also add the control of conformity with the Convention – in order to protect minority rights.108 Indeed, to enable judges to feel free to interpret the law without waiting for the reaction of Congress, limits must be established for the Legislature to impeach and remove judges.109 Consequently, any reasoning concerning the analysis of an alleged violation of the judicial independence and judicial guarantees of judges subjected to impeachment by the Legislature, must analyze different standards, in the context of the detailed scrutiny required by the greater guarantees enjoyed by judges under the constitutional and democratic rule of law. B) Following the precedent of the 2001 case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru (applicability “in general” to impeachment of the rights established in Article 8(2)) 82. According to a long line of the case law of the Inter-American Court, the guarantees established in Article 8(2) of the American Convention are applicable to any action of any branch of the State in which the rights of the individual are affected. This was also recognized with regard to the impeachment in the oft-cited case of the Constitutional Court v. Peru. And, specifically in the present case, the ICourtHR found it “opportune to ratify the fundamental criteria contained”110 in this 2001 precedent, and thus “ratife[d] the following criteria mentioned in that case”:111 68. Respect for human rights constitutes a limit to a State’s activity, and this is true for any organ or official in a situation of power, due to its official nature, with regard to other persons. Consequently, any form of exercising public power that violates the rights recognized in the Convention is unlawful. This is even more important when the State exercises its power to sanction, because this not only presumes that the authorities act with total respect for the legal system, but Redish, Martin H, “Response: Good Behavior, Judicial Independence, and the Foundations of American Constitutionalism”, Yale Law Journal, vol. 136, 2006-2007, p. 148-149 and 156. 106 107 Statement of expert witness Despouy during the public hearing on March 18, 2013. 108 Ibidem, p. 141. Perlin, Adam A., “The Impeachment of Samuel Chase: Redefining Judicial Independence”, Rutgers Law Review, vol. 62:3, 2010, pp. 729, 788. 109 110 Para. 165 of the Judgment. 111 Para. 166 of the Judgment. 21