congresses, which those congresses should never consider that they are exempt from complying with. IX. DISSENT: THE NEED TO ANALYZE AND TO DECLARE THE AUTONOMOUS VIOLATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF LEGALITY (ARTICLES 9 AND 1(1) OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION) A) Introduction and difference with the case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador 103. As I stated at the start of this opinion, I dissent from the majority opinion with regard to the seventh operative paragraph of the Judgment. 134 Indeed, I consider that the Inter-American Court should have made a specific analysis of the arguments concerning the violation of the principle of legality established in Article 9 of the American Convention, and have declared that, in this case, the said right was violated autonomously to the detriment of the eight victims. 104. In principle, it should not be overlooked that, in this case (related to an arbitrary termination and irregular impeachment proceedings against the victims), the State acknowledged expressly its responsibility with regard to the violation of Article 9 of the Pact of San José in relation to the termination of the victims as members of the Constitutional Tribunal. Indeed, the State indicated that this article had been violated: 135 because there were no grounds established by law for the removal from office of the presumed victims […] although it is true that the National Congress could make a constitutional and legal analysis, this should have included clear mechanisms to submit to review the tenure and the duration of the terms of the former members of the Constitutional Tribunal. The absence of legal certainty concerning the grounds for removing the former members obliges the State to acknowledge its international responsibility in this regard. 105. It is true that it was difficult to understand the scope of the acknowledgement of international responsibility on this point from the State’s declaration. First, in this case, there were grounds for removing the members of the Constitutional Tribunal, on the basis of which impeachment proceedings could be conducted against them. It is also true that the State did not acknowledge any violation related to the impeachment proceedings that were held, because it limited its acquiescence to the facts of the termination resulting from the resolution of the National Congress of November 25, 2004. 106. Nevertheless, I believe that there is a substantial difference between what was decided in the case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador 136 and the instant case, which is the reason I differed from the majority opinion on this aspect. In particular, it should be recalled that, in that case, the ICourtHR considered that the organ that terminated the justices did not have competence; whereas, in the case of the Constitutional Tribunal, which prompts this partially dissenting opinion, the litigation was not focused exclusively on the termination of the judges, but also on the alleged violations in relation to the impeachment proceeding, which the National Congress was competent to conduct. In other words, in the case of the Supreme Court of Justice, the “7. It is not required to make a ruling on the alleged violation of Article 9 of the American Convention on Human Rights, in the terms of paragraphs 223 and 224 of this Judgment. 134 135 Para. 14 of the Judgment. Case of the Supreme Court of Justice (Quintana Coello et al.) v. Ecuador. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 23, 2013. Series C, No. 266. 136 28