and its relationship with democracy (paras. 62-71); (vi) the jurisdictional nature of impeachment and the different rights related to the Convention’s provisions on due process of law, political rights, and judicial protection that were violated (paras. 72-96); (vii) the failure to make a specific analysis of the rights established in Article 8(2) of the Pact of San José (paras. 97-102) and, lastly, (viii) my dissent owing to the failure to analyze the principle of legality established in Article 9 of the American Convention, and its violation owing to the sanction imposed on the victims (paras. 103-140). II. THE FUNCTION OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE UNDER THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC RULE OF LAW 8. This case underlines the importance of one of the main defining factors of the constitutional and democratic rule of law, which is that of the independence of judges. In general terms, it can be said, first, that a judge is independent if he takes his decisions based only on the case, without being influenced by specific considerations relating to the parties that are not relevant for the particular matter, and if he takes his decision free of considerations relating to his own interest or to the interests of the persons or body that appointed him.9 9. To achieve this objective, institutional guarantees can be established that permit a judge to exercise his independence. These guarantees include tenure, a secure remuneration, and the method and form of appointment and the termination of his or her functions.10 Indeed, in the Federalista LXXVIII it is said that nothing can contribute as effectively to his rigor and independence as tenure, and good conduct should be the rule for the duration of judges in office.11 However, these guarantees will never be sufficient if the judge does not wish to exercise them. 12 10. However, from an institutional perspective, judicial independence is consubstantial with the principle of the separation of powers; while both elements are essential for understanding an authentic rule of law. Regarding the principle of the separation of public powers, it is common to assert that, nowadays, this cannot be conceived in an absolute and rigid manner; rather the modern concept entails a distribution of the State’s functions by means of the appropriate organization of mutual and reciprocal relationships and controls among the powers. Thus, instead of their absolute separation, what this principle really seeks is to avoid a concentration of powers.13 11. Since its most remote historical origins, the separation of powers has always signified the independence of the Judiciary in relation to the political power. The independence of the Judiciary has always been understood as a necessary consequence of the separation of powers designed to ensure the resistance of judges to pressures or MacDonald, Roderick A. and Kong, Hoi, “Judicial Independence as a constitutional virtue”, in Michel Rosenfeld and András Sajó, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law, Oxford University Press, 2012, p. 832. Similarly, Chaires Zaragoza, Jorge, “La independencia del poder judicial”, Boletín Mexicano de Derecho Comparado, new series, year XXXVII, No. 110, May-August 2004, p. 532. 9 Ernst, Carlos, “Independencia judicial and democracia”, in Jorge Malem, Jesús Orozco and Rodolfo Vázquez (comps.), La función judicial. Ética and democracia, Barcelona, Gedisa, 2003, p. 236. 10 Hamilton, A., Madison, J. and Jay, J., El federalista, translated by Gustavo R. Velasco, Mexico, Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1st re-edition, 2004, pp. 331 and 335. 11 12 MacDonald, Roderick A. and Kong, Hoi, op. cit., p. 834. Kelsen, Hans, General Theory of Law and State, translated by Anders Wedberg, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 2009, p. 282. 13 3