20. It could even be considered whether it is possible to constitute a sort of right of the defendants to the democratic conditions of public institutions, based not only on the said Article 3, but also on Article 29 of the Convention,23 which would be supported by the State’s international obligation to exercise its powers in accordance with the rule of law, the separation of powers and, evidently, the independence of the judges, as has been proposed in other cases in which the Court has decided similar issues. 24 A standard of this type would go beyond the concept of democracy in interpretive terms, as the ICourtHR has indicated, in the sense that “the just requirements of democracy must […] guide the interpretation of the Convention and, in particular, of those provisions that are significantly related to the preservation and functioning of the democratic institutions.”25 II. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CONTEXT IN THIS CASE 21. In keeping with the proven facts in this case, the dismissal of the members of the three high courts of Ecuador; that is, the Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Court of Justice, and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal occurred as a result of a political arrangement between the President of the Republic at the time, Lucio Gutiérrez, who it was sought to impeach for the offense of embezzlement, and the Ecuadorian Roldosista Party. Meanwhile, the leader of that party, the former President of the Republic, Abdalá Bucaram, sought the annulment of several criminal proceedings that were being processed before the Supreme Court.26 22. Thus, on November 23, 2004, President Gutiérrez Borbúa announced the Government’s intention of proposing to Congress the reorganization of the Constitutional Tribunal, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and the Supreme Court of Justice. On November 25, 2004, the National Congress, by a resolution, decided that the titular members of the Constitutional Tribunal and their alternates had been appointed illegally in 2003, and terminated the functions of all the titular members and their alternates, some of whom were impeached by Congress several days later. In addition, Congress determined the termination of the titular judges of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and their alternates, because they had been appointed without taking into account the provisions of article 209 of the Constitution. 23. On December 1, 2004, a first attempt was made to impeach some members of the Constitutional Tribunal, without obtaining the necessary votes to remove them. Accordingly, on December 5, President Gutiérrez Borbúa called for a special session of the National 23 “Article 29. Restrictions regarding interpretation No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as: a. permitting any State Party, group, or person to suppress the enjoyment or exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized in this Convention or to restrict them to a greater extent than is provided for herein; b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said states is a party; c. precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of government; or d. excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have.” Case of Apitz Barbera et al. (“First Contentious Administrative Court”) v. Venezuela. Preliminary objection, merits, reparations and costs. Judgment of August 5, 2008. Series C No. 182, para. 222. 24 Cf. Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts. 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, para. 44. 25 26 Cf. paras. 55, 56, 211 and 219 of the Judgment. 6