Chapter 1 other candidates.” Wis. Stat. § 9.01(6)(a), at p. 693. Mr. Logic did not serve a notice of appeal on Mayor Kieck, but a law clerk working in the office of the lawyer who represented Mr. Logic did serve a notice of appeal on the South Milwaukee City Clerk. And there was a Wisconsin statute that said that personal service could be made by serving “an agent authorized to accept service of summons for the defendant.” Wisc. Stat. Rule 801.11(1)(d), at 695. In addition, Mr. Kieck knew of the appeal and was allowed to intervene (participate) in the case. But the circuit court dismissed Mr. Logic’s appeal because he did not serve Mayor Kieck directly. Mr. Logic appealed the circuit court’s decision. The appeals court began by saying that generally a court does not have jurisdiction over an action if a defect in filing the action or serving a party was fundamental rather than technical. The court ruled that “A defect is ‘fundamental’ if it defeats ‘the purpose of the rule,’” at 694, and that the purpose of requiring service of the notice of the appeal in this situation was to give the other candidates a chance to protect their interests. The appeals court found that because the failure to serve the notice of appeal defeated the purpose of allowing another candidate to protect his or her interests, that failure was fundamental. And because Mr. Logic’s failure to serve notice was a fundamental failure, the court did not have jurisdiction over his case; it did not matter that Mayor Kieck actually knew about the appeal. The appeals court then examined Mr. Logic’s argument that the statute requiring service of the notice of appeal should be interpreted, like most election laws, to be directory not mandatory in order to preserve the will of the electorate. The questions of when election procedures are mandatory and when they are directory, and how courts should protect the will of the electorate, are large topics that are crucial to the resolution of election disputes and will be discussed throughout the rest of this book (and in detail in Chapter 3). For now, however, it is sufficient to know that Mr. Logic was asking the appeals court to apply a broadly accepted rule that the people’s expression of their will, through casting their ballots, should be honored even though there has been some irregularity in some procedure, as long as the irregularity is not basic to the election process, does not change the result of the election and was not the result of fraud. But the appeals court concluded that the notice requirement that allows other candidates a chance to protect their interests has nothing to do with the will of the electorate. The court said, [T]his is an electorate-will neutral requirement—no vote’s validity is affected directly by the application of [the statute]. Accordingly, the will-of-the-electorate rule does not apply here. At 694-695. And the appeals court went further and said that even if the will of the electorate was involved in this case, the failure to serve notice was fundamental and therefore it was basic to the appeal process. So the requirement that other candidates be served with notice of the appeal would be mandatory, not directory. Finally, the appeals court addressed Mr. Logic’s argument that the mayor actually was served in his personal capacity because service was made on the city clerk, and service on the city clerk should have been considered the same as service on the mayor. The appeals court disagreed, saying that Mayor Kieck was running for office in his personal capacity, not in his official capacity. And even if the city clerk was the proper person to serve if the mayor was being sued in his official capacity for something he did as the mayor, the city clerk was not the proper person to serve with the notice of appeal in this case because there was no evidence that Mayor Kieck had authorized or appointed the city clerk to accept service for him in his capacity as a candidate. 7