The Resolution of Election Disputes: Legal Principles that Control Election Challenges 836 S.W.2d 203 836 S.W.2d 203 (Cite as: 836 S.W.2d 203) Page 10 deed another 116 illegal voters. Once again, we note that great deference must be given to the judge's determination of the witnesses' credibility and the weight of their testimony. See Middleton, 687 S.W.2d at 44. We will reverse only where the record shows that the judge's Findings are so weak as to render the outcome manifestly unjust or clearly wrong. See In re Kings Estate, 150 Tex. at 664-65, 244 S.W.2d at 661. Further, the Rules of Evidence and prior caselaw clearly state that signatures may be properly authenticated where the trier of fact has an opportunity to compare the signatures to determine their genuineness. [FN8] See Tex.R.Civ.Evid. 901(b)(2) & (b)(3). See also In re Estate of Watson, 720 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex.1986); Strong v. State, 805 S.W.2d 478, 486 (Tex.App.--Tyler 1990, pet. ref'd). We find the trial court's conclusion of genuineness and Ms. Duganier's comparison based upon voter names, voter registration numbers and precinct numbers are sufficient evidence to support the trial court's Finding that an additional 116 illegal votes existed. FN8. In addition, we note that nonexpert comparison of voters' signatures is clearly sanctioned under the Election Code. Tex.Elec.Code Ann. § 87.027(e) (Vernon Supp.1992). Indeed, no expertise is needed in order to serve on a Signature Verification Committee; rather: To be eligible to serve on a signature verification committee, a person must be a qualified voter: (1) of the county, in a countywide election ordered by the governor or a county authority in a primary election; (2) of the part of the county in which the election is held, for an election ordered by the governor or a county authority that does not cover the entire county of the person's residence; or (3) of the political subdivision, in an election ordered by an authority of a political subdivision other than a county. Id. [12] Further, appellant complains that Findings of Fact numbers five and eight are erroneous because the trial court simply "generalize[d]" the reasons why the testimony of the remaining 116 illegal voters was not procured. The court 236 stated that: The remaining individuals fell into several different categories: crossover voters that were subpoenaed but failed to appear; *213 crossover voters that resisted service; crossover voters that evidence showed had moved and could not be located; and others that neither party chose to subpoena. Appellant surmises that "[t]his is an euphemism for the voters that Reyes did not want to produce." Interestingly, appellant's own brief admits that there were some 27 voters who were subpoenaed but failed to appear and that some others resisted service. Moreover, witnesses for both sides testified that difficulties arose in serving some of the people for whom subpoenas were issued. Furthermore, appellant states that the trial court's Finding number seven unfairly "accepted as true the testimony of every voter witness who testified as to how they voted.... [but] attempts to introduce some uncertainty into this process by stating that '[m]any of the voters who disclosed their vote did so with qualifications such as "I think" or "I probably".' " Although appellant argues that the court's statement about the lack of decisiveness was unsupported by the record, appellant himself admits that "a few were uncertain as to their vote." A thorough review of the record clearly demonstrates that some voters' testimony was not procured because of failure to appear, resistance to service or inability to locate. Additionally, the record reflects that some illegal voters refused to disclose for whom they had voted and even more disclosed who they had voted for with some qualifications such as those noted by the trial court. Therefore, we find sufficient evidence to support the trial court's Findings and overrule appellant's points of error sixteen, seventeen and eighteen. [13][14] Finally, in his thirteenth and fourteenth points of error, appellant asserts that the trial court erred by allowing affidavits of illegal voters to be admitted into evidence and by allowing thirty-five voters to testify over the telephone. While appellant raises these issues as points of error at the beginning of his brief, he does not specifically address them. The Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure require that argument and authority must be brought forth in support of each point of error for such error to be properly before the © 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.