The Resolution of Election Disputes: Legal Principles that Control Election Challenges 670 A.2d 629 543 Pa. 216, 670 A.2d 629 (Cite as: 543 Pa. 216, 670 A.2d 629) that fraud in the election occurred between the first machine count on November 2 and the second machine count on January 5. Since the ballots were in the exclusive control of the Board of Elections and/or the court during that time, the only logical conclusion to be reached from the Petition is that any alleged ballot tampering occurred while the ballots should have been secured by the Board of Elections. Laughlin equates the ballot tampering alleged here with the forgery of signatures on absentee ballots alleged in Orsatti, which the Commonwealth Court found not to constitute an administrative breakdown. However, in Orsatti, there was no indication that the ballots were under the Election Board's control at the time the alleged forgeries occurred. In contrast, the failure to adequately secure ballot boxes alleged here qualifies as a breakdown in the Board of Elections' operation due to some failure on the part of its officers. Therefore, Zupsic's Petition to Contest satisfies the Orsatti standard. [7][8] In addition to the nunc pro tunc arguments, Laughlin contends that the facts do not support the court of common pleas' conclusion that tampering in fact occurred. This Court is bound by the trial court's findings of fact unless those findings are not based on competent evidence. Thatcher's Drug Store v. Consolidated Supermarkets, 535 Pa. 469, 477, 636 A.2d 156, 160 (1994). Our review of the record in this matter convinces us that there was more than competent evidence to support the trial court's finding of tampering. The court of common pleas based its finding of tampering on the following evidence: (1) the voting tabulation machines were operating accurately on both election night and when the second machine *233 count was taken on January 5, 1994, Petition I, Finding of Fact No. 2; Petition II, slip op. at 1; (2) the results of the two machine tabulations revealed "substantial" differences in the vote totals for each candidate, Petition II, slip op. at 1; (3) these differences occurred "for the most part" within the District Justice race and in five particular precincts within that race, id.; (4) "substantial" differences occurred in the overvote totals between the two machine counts because "a number of altered marks had been placed next to Laughlin's name 250 Page 9 and the oval alongside Zupsic's name was completely filled," id. at 2; (5) "substantial" differences also occurred in the undervote totals between the two machine counts "because a number of altered marks were placed alongside Laughlin's name and the oval alongside Zupsic's name had not been filled," id.; (6) the changes in the undervote and overvote totals were favorable to Laughlin, id.; (7) the ballot boxes were left unsecured for a period of time because the numbered seals on the boxes were not recorded until the Write-in and Return Boards completed their work, id. at 2-3; (8) "numerous" keys had been distributed to the ballot boxes on Election Day, and any one key could open all the boxes, id. at 3; (9) "more than one person" had a key to the room where the ballot boxes were stored after the election, id.; (10) forty-five of the eighty-seven ballots contested by Laughlin and Zupsic had "substantially inconsistent" marks from most other marks on the ballot, including situations where no marks existed for any other individual candidates either anywhere on the ballot or anywhere on the reverse side of the ballot, where the District Justice candidates were listed, id.; *234 (11) five voters testified that they did not place a mark on their ballots for Laughlin, even though their ballots indicated otherwise, id.; and (12) Laughlin was the winner on election night of nine of the fourteen precincts her petitions sought to be recounted, some by wide margins. Id. There are certainly instances where the court could have been more precise in its factual findings--for example, detailing the initial vote tabulation, identifying the five precincts involved, indicating the number of keys distributed, and detailing the nature of **638 the altered marks. However, our review of the record reveals substantial evidence to support the court's findings that ballot tampering occurred to at least some degree. This is so even if one sets aside the findings detailed in paragraphs (11) and (12) above, which concern matters that Laughlin challenges and which we discuss below. © 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.