Keating v. Iozzo 508 N.E.2d 503 155 Ill.App.3d 774, 508 N.E.2d 503, 108 Ill.Dec. 342 (Cite as: 155 Ill.App.3d 774, 508 N.E.2d 503, 108 Ill.Dec. 342) suant to statute and the discretion of the clerk was irrelevant. The court disposed of plaintiff's second argument by distinguishing Sesser and expressly refusing to discuss the hypothetical situation where plaintiff could have come to the office to file her objections on Saturday afternoon and found it closed. [4] Thus, while Mierswa did not resolve the issue we now confront, it is apparent that the court had before it many of the same factors now before us. Plaintiff in Mierswa had actual opportunity to file on that particular Saturday from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. and had statutory notice that the opportunity was available from 9 a.m. to noon. Moreover, the court specifically noted that plaintiff stipulated that the office had been open until 5 p.m. and did not argue that she had been unable to file on Saturday. As noted above, two of these factors--opportunity and notice--were also pertinent in Pettigrove v. Parro Construction Corp. (1963), 44 Ill.App.2d 421, 194 N.E.2d 521, Burgess v. Erickson (1966), 72 Ill.App.2d 85, 218 N.E.2d 111, and John Allen Co. v. Sesser Concrete Products Co. (1969), 114 Ill.App.2d 186, 252 N.E.2d 361. We conclude that when a plaintiff has no opportunity to comply with a statutory deadline, or no notice of such an opportunity, it is likely the deadline will be extended. On the other hand, when plaintiff has notice of the opportunity to comply, and can **508 ***347 show no hardship resulting from limitations on the opportunity, extension of a statutory deadline is disfavored. Page 5 wished to file. Iozzo himself testified that he was so informed. Thus, even if Iozzo had believed the clerk would be available during the entire time the village hall was open, he was personally informed otherwise directly by the clerk. [5] Finally, according to the record Iozzo made no showing, either at the time or at the subsequent hearing, that the limited hours set by the clerk worked a hardship on him or made it impossible for him to comply with the filing deadline. Since the objector had both notice and an opportunity to file, and showed no hardship from the limits on his opportunity, we cannot say that the filing deadline should have been extended. Iozzo's objections were not timely filed, and the petitioners' names were properly placed back on the ballot. In accord with the views expressed above, the order of the circuit court of DuPage County is affirmed. AFFIRMED. WOODWARD and DUNN, JJ., concur. 155 Ill.App.3d 774, 508 N.E.2d 503, 108 Ill.Dec. 342 END OF DOCUMENT In the case at bar there is no evidence that the village clerk was under any statutory or local obligation to be present in her office at any specific time or to provide deputy clerks to function in her stead. That the village hall may have been open does not establish that the clerk's presence was required during village hall hours. The evidence does not demonstrate, either, that the clerk voluntarily set up and *781 maintained regular office hours. In fact, it seems clear she was not customarily present in her office on a full-time basis. Regardless, however, of what the clerk's hours were, or whether she even kept regular hours, on the last day for filing objections she personally contacted all the candidates by telephone to inform them she was in her office and indicated how long she would be there to accept any objections they © 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 311