The Resolution of Election Disputes: Legal Principles that Control Election Challenges slightly different name of similar pronunciation or sound has been written instead of the actual name of the candidate intended to be voted for.”) In these cases the intent of the voter must prevail if it can be determined. That is not the case here, however, as none of the markings were made inside the “No” target. In such a case, the mark is unauthorized and uncountable. While “[t]he primary test of validity is whether the voter’s intent is sufficiently shown,” this intent cannot be derived from ballots that are marked inconsistently with the voting instructions provided on the ballot and the marking requirements of the statute. Devine, 268 N.W.2d at 628. At 661 (some internal citations omitted) (emphasis supplied). In Taylor, the voters’ intent to vote against authorizing a tax levy to pay for the bonds was unclear, at least to the extent that the recount board thought that the voters on three of the ballots wanted to vote “No,” while the contest board and the district court thought that the marks did not clearly show the voters’ intent. Did the uncertainty about the voters’ intent cause the Iowa Supreme Court to decide that the requirement for marking the referendum ballot in the oval was mandatory? Were there other aspects of the case that may have led the supreme court to its decision? Remember that the supreme court went through a statutory analogy in order to reach the conclusion that the statute should be read to incorporate the language of another statute that required rejection of the ballot; a statute that requires the rejection of a ballot when there is a violation of its terms is considered to be mandatory. And in reaching its result in Taylor, the supreme court had to distinguish Devine, which was a leading case in the state. Finally, in Taylor the other measure on the referendum ballot, which authorized issuing $4,605,000 worth of general obligation bonds, passed easily, making it illogical that the same ballot would result in a vote against authorizing a tax levy to pay for the bonds. When all is said and done, it is likely that the Iowa Supreme Court decided that the voters’ marks on the ballot in Taylor were not like the actions of the voters in Devine, where voters’ attempts to write in Mr. Devine’s name, in many instances using stickers with Mr. Devine’s name on them, showed that the voters were clearly trying to do something to put his name on the ballot, and that the voters probably wanted to vote for him. Under those circumstances, applying strict rules that would defeat those voters’ attempts to mark the ballot for Mr. Devine would seem to fly in the face of the voters’ intent. It is easier to say that voters’ intent is not clear when a mark on the ballot is not where it is supposed to be, and it is supposed to be only in one place. But could the use of stickers to vote for Mr. Devine withstand a statute that prohibited the use of stickers and said that contests for which stickers are put on ballots shall not be counted? The short answer is no, despite the fact that the voters’ intent to vote for that candidate is absolutely clear. Mary Kibbe and Chip Gehres were on the ballot for the position of selectman of the Town of Milton, New Hampshire, in March 1996. Then Joan Tasker Ball mounted a write-in campaign and had stickers printed with her name on them and an X to the right of her name. Ms. Kibbe got 190 votes, Mr. Gehres got 174 votes and Joan Tasker Ball got 107 handwritten votes. But 113 sticker votes for Ms. Ball were not counted because the town’s attorney said they were illegal under New Hampshire law. When Ms. Ball asked for a recount, the board of recount decided to count the stickers that were placed precisely in the write-in space on the ballot and had an X written in or printed on the ballot in the proper place to the right of Ms. Ball’s name. After the recount, Ms. Ball won with 215 votes over Ms. Kibbe’s 191 votes. Ms. Kibbe appealed to the superior court, which upheld the board’s decision, ruling that the voters’ clear intent to vote for Ms. Ball made the statute directory. 80