The Resolution of Election Disputes: Legal Principles that Control Election Challenges 323 So.2d 259. 323 So.2d 259 (Cite as: 323 So.2d 259) Page 5 pected to be absent from the county and not just the city on election day rendered the ballot of no effect. We also said that the Legislature did not merely suggest a form of affidavit, but specifically stated in detail the substance and manner of its execution in Fla.Stat. s 101.07, 1941, F.S.A.[FN1] FN1. It is interesting to note that Fla.Stat. s 101.07, 1941, F.S.A., strictly interpreted in Frink, was amended in the legislative session immediately following our rendering of Frink. See s 1, Ch. 25385, 1949 Laws of Florida. At the time Frink was decided s 101.07 required the county clerks to furnish a ballot which, Inter alia, included an oath to be taken and subscribed to by the elector. The oath was spelled out in the text of the statute. The amended version, s 1, Ch. 25385, 1949, in addition to other changes in the statute, prescribed a new form of oath for the application. However, instead of requiring the specific oath prescribed in the statute, as we determined was the legislative intent in Frink, the new version simply required the execution of an oath in Substantially the same form prescribed therein. This part of the statute remains unchanged. *264 The strict interpretation rule was reaffirmed in the subsequent cases before this Court,[FN2] however, not without exceptions. In State ex rel. Titus v. Peacock, 125 Fla. 810, 170 So. 309 (1936), decided after Hutchins but before Frink, we held that an erroneous or unlawful handling of otherwise valid absentee ballots by election officials will not void the ballots, provided the votes were legal in their inception and still capable of being given proper effect as such. This principle was reaffirmed in Jolley, supra, in 1952, thus etching an exception to the general rule of strict interpretation of absentee voting laws.[FN3] FN2. Jolley v. Whatley, 60 So.2d 762 (Fla.1952); Griffith v. Knoth, 67 So.2d 431 (Fla.1953); Wood v. Diefenbach, 81 So.2d 777 (Fla.1955); Parra v. Harvey, 89 So.2d 870 (Fla.1956); McDonald v. Miller, 90 So.2d 124 (Fla.1956). FN3. In Titus, we cited 9 R.C.L. s 102, pp. 158 1093--1095, as well as Hutchins, for support of the exception we mention here. Although the cited paragraph does not refer to absentee ballots or statutes, it does make the pertinent observation that: 'In short, a fair election and honest return should be considered as paramount in importance to minor requirements which prescribe the formal steps to reach that end, and the law should be so construed as to remedy the evil against which its provisions are directed and at the same time not to disenfranchise voters further than is necessary to attain that object.' 9 C.R.L. s 102, pp. 1093--1095. [1] Without further analysis of the case law, and realizing as we do that strict compliance has been required by this Court in other cases, we now recede from that rule and hereby reaffirm the rule adopted in Tucker to the effect that substantial compliance with the absentee voting laws is all that is required to give legality to the ballot. We offer no opinion as to the validity of the ballots found to be invalid in the prior decisions had they been measured by the substantial compliance standard. [2] Originally absentee voting statutes were directed at making the voting privilege available to those engaged in military service. Rinehart, supra. Therefore, absentee voting was considered a privilege granted to electors, not an absolute right. Frink supra. The purpose of the enactment of absentee voter statutes, therefore, was to enable a qualified voter to vote at a general election in the precinct of his domicile were he temporarily absent therefrom. Times obviously have changed, however, since the absentee voting laws were first enacted in Florida in 1917. We are no longer in the horse and buggy age. Society is much more mobile today and in fact depends to a great extent upon its mobility for survival. Regardless of the original reasons for the enactment of the absentee voter laws, they must be interpreted in light of modern conditions. This does not require a full scale re-enactment of the law. That is for the Legislature to do, and in fact that statute has been amended several times over the years. But the mere fact that a statute was enacted in 1917 does not require us to interpret it with a turnof-the-century perspective. Although the convenience of the voter may not have been one of the considerations for the © 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.