The Resolution of Election Disputes: Legal Principles that Control Election Challenges At 508 (emphasis supplied). Under these circumstances, the appeals court decided that Mr. Iozzo did not introduce any evidence that would meet legal standards. The appeals court concluded that, Since the objector had both notice and an opportunity to file, and showed no hardship from the limits on his opportunity, we cannot say that the filing deadline should have been extended. Iozzo’s objections were not timely filed, and the petitioners’ names were properly placed back on the ballot. At 507-508. Thus, the appeals court affirmed the trial court’s decision, which had reversed the electoral board’s decision. In effect, the appeals court said that the electoral board should have made its decision on the basis of evidentiary standards that were not clear until the appeals court enunciated them, long after the electoral board had acted. What could the electoral board have done to avoid the appeals court’s conclusion that the board’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence? When the appeals court extrapolated legal standards from past cases to determine that the board’s decision was against the manifest weight of the evidence in this case, did the appeals court second guess the board’s fact finding even while proclaiming that the court would not do so? The answer is no, because the only way a court can determine if particular facts are relevant is to examine them in relation to the law, and it is the court’s job to define the law. So if the law is unclear, as it was in Keating, an administrative board or trial court naturally runs the risk that its interpretation of the law will be overruled when an appeals court clarifies the law to mean something different from the meaning that the board or lower court applied to the facts. And when that happens, the board’s or the lower court’s decision may be found to not have been supported by substantial evidence, or to have been contrary to the law. The appeals court in Keating said its review was “not intended to provide a de novo hearing,” and that is the thrust of this chapter. But what difference would it have made if the court would have provided a de novo hearing? One answer is illustrated by Devine v. Wonderlich, 268 N.W.2d 620 (Iowa 1978), which we discussed in detail in Chapter 4. Briefly, Francis P. Devine had won election as a write-in candidate by two votes (2,655 to 2,653) to be the Keokuk, Iowa, county supervisor (commissioner). But a court reviewed a number of claims in a lawsuit brought by Mr. Devine’s opponent, Raymond James Wonderlich, and decided that some of the ballots should not have been counted. After calculating the new totals, the court found that Mr. Wonderlich had won the election by 135 votes (2,638 to 2,503). Mr. Wonderlich’s challenge was based on a variety of ways that Mr. Devine’s name had been written in: there were differences in the exact spelling of his first and/or last names; many people used stickers (with his name on them) placed in varying ways and places on the ballot; and in some instances Mr. Devine’s name was written two or three times, crossed out, or written partially and rewritten. Mr. Devine appealed from the trial court to the district court but still lost. Mr. Devine then appealed to the Iowa Supreme Court. 126