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G.R. No. 153945
The liberal construction of punitive laws in relation to the prescription of offenses cannot be invoked to prejudice the
interest of the State to prosecute election offenses, especially those which the COMELEC described as "ruffling the
electoral system."16
Third Issue: Whether the COMELEC en banc’s assumption of original jurisdiction over the case violated the
Constitution.
Petitioners rely on Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution which states:
"Sec. 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its rules of
procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies. All such
election cases shall be heard and decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
decided by the Commission en banc."
Petitioners assert that this constitutional provision serves as basis to nullify the proceedings conducted and orders
issued by the COMELEC en banc in E.O. Case No. 97-503. Petitioners cite Sarmiento v. Comelec17 and Zarate v.
Comelec18 to support their stand that the COMELEC en banc acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion when it assumed original jurisdiction over the case without first referring the same to any of its divisions.
In Sarmiento and Zarate, the Court similarly held that "election cases must first be heard and decided by a Division
of the Commission," and that the "Commission, sitting en banc, does not have the authority to hear and decide the
same at the first instance."
In its Comment for the COMELEC, the Solicitor General points out that the rulings in Sarmiento and Zarate were
clarified in Canicosa v. COMELEC19 to mean that –
"[I]t is only in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi judicial powers that the COMELEC is mandated to hear and
decide cases first by division and then, upon motion for reconsideration, by the COMELEC en banc. This is when it
is jurisdictional."
The Solicitor General contends that the conduct of a preliminary investigation before the filing of an information in
court does not in any way adjudicate with finality the rights and liabilities of the parties investigated. A preliminary
investigation does not make any pronouncement as to the guilt or innocence of the party involved. Hence, a
preliminary investigation cannot be considered a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding required to be heard by the
Division in the first instance.
On the other hand, petitioners countered that in Cruz v. People,20 the Court held that the conduct of a preliminary
investigation "is a judicial or quasi-judicial proceeding since there is opportunity to be heard and for the production
and weighing of evidence and a decision is rendered thereon."
Under Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasijudicial powers. The COMELEC’s administrative powers are found in Section 2 (1), (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), and (9)
of Article IX-C.21 The 1987 Constitution does not prescribe how the COMELEC should exercise its administrative
powers, whether en banc or in division. The Constitution merely vests the COMELEC’s administrative powers in the
"Commission on Elections," while providing that the COMELEC "may sit en banc or in two divisions." Clearly, the
COMELEC en banc can act directly on matters falling within its administrative powers. Indeed, this has been the
practice of the COMELEC both under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.22
On the other hand, the COMELEC’s quasi-judicial powers are found in Section 2 (2) of Article IX-C, to wit:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
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(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all
elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective municipal
officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective barangay officials decided by trial courts
of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests involving elective municipal and barangay
offices shall be final, executory, and not appealable."
The COMELEC’s exercise of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Section 3 of Article IX-C which expressly requires
that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the COMELEC in division, and
the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en banc. It follows, as held by the Court in
Canicosa,23 that the COMELEC is mandated to decide cases first in division, and then upon motion for
reconsideration en banc, only when the COMELEC exercises its quasi-judicial powers.
https://lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2003/feb2003/gr_153945_2003.html
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