An Integrated Approach to Elections and Conflict of internal UN information sharing have been frequently discussed, this issue also exists in other organizations in relation to elections and conflict. International humanitarian organizations, such as Mercy Corps, CARE and Oxfam, that may be heavily involved in peacebuilding activities either maintain separate divisions for electoral assistance or do not focus on that area of work.2 In a notable exception, Oxfam partnered with IFES in its Election Violence Education and Resolution (EVER) program and accompanying conflict prevention efforts in Burundi in 2010. While there is nothing wrong with specialization among donors or international organizations, the lack of vision in sharing information and addressing what is clearly a cross-sector issue limits our efforts to address electoral violence. The post-election crisis in Kenya in 2007-08 was, in part, due to these limitations. Before the election, property and ethnic conflicts were simmering in the lead-up to a winner-take-all election. Unresolved political and land conflicts in the Rift Valley over the last two decades had been characterized as government-supported by human rights groups and researchers. While the elections in 2002 were relatively peaceful, as was (to a lesser degree) the 2005 referendum, political inequities and underlying conflicts were not resolved. The proposed constitution was voted down in the referendum. The government associated opposition parties with ethnic rivals involved in ongoing land conflicts in the Rift Valley. The president replaced 19 of 22 election commissioners in the lead-up to the election. There seemed to be reluctance among the international community to assess and react to the possible risks of conflict and outright violence as Election Day approached, and the outcome promised to be extremely close. The perception among some development sectors that their work had paid off with a stable system was not shared by many of the grassroots and conflict-focused groups who noted the increase of inflammatory rhetoric and hate speech on local radio stations and growing frustrations with the incumbent party during the pre-election period.3 It was only after the violence erupted that this gap in information and perceptions began to be addressed. An Integrated Approach Bridging this gap requires reframing elections and conflict. It starts with looking at the electoral cycle and the conflict cycle as the bases of two different types of programming. The electoral cycle (as described above) allows for an expanded view of all electoral processes and related programming that incorporates the social and political context during and between elections. It also extends to such activities as analyzing election results, the formation of government, preparation of reforms and procedures for the next set of elections and supporting education and advocacy activities related to election and election reform. The conflict cycle (in which a country experiences cyclical periods of latent violence, escalation of tension, violent outbreaks and de-escalation of conflict) is the source of common conflict programming responses (Figure 2 and 3), just as the electoral cycle approach helps frame electoral assistance activities. The conflict cycle helps us situate visible violence as a part of a longer process, just as Election Day is but one point in the electoral cycle. While violence appears to erupt suddenly, it is simply one stage in the cycle. Thus, electoral violence has its roots in each cycle and the most efficient responses to electoral conflict will also be rooted in both cycles. 2 This draws in part from the author’s interactions with humanitarian organizations in the field during EVER projects in relation to information sharing and other issues surrounding electoral violence risks and prevention. One humanitarian organization country director in Sudan specifically noted that there was not a way for its voter education work to contribute, when asked what the organization might be able to do regarding disseminating information on peaceful electoral competition or identified risks in communities. 3 Brown, Stephen, (2009) “Donor responses to the 2008 Kenyan crisis: Finally getting it right?” Journal of Contemporary African Studies, 27:3 389-486. Brown, Stephen, “Quiet Diplomacy and Recurring “Ethnic Clashes” in Kenya,” in From Promise to Practice: Strengthening UN Capacities for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, Sriram, Chandra Lekha, Ed. 2003. 2