Unfair Advantage: The Abuse of State Resources in Elections VI. Conclusion With appropriately functioning oversight institutions and effective enforcement of assigned penalties, sanctions, and remedies, it is possible for countries to craft a set of laws and regulations that can deter and mitigate the misuse of state resources in elections. The authors identified several relevant principles in the Approach section of this paper. These include: (1) establishing effective mechanisms to prevent public officials from taking unfair advantage of their positions in order to influence the outcome of elections; (2) ensuring effective and transparent oversight of these mechanisms by independent institutions; and (3) making available appropriate and enforceable sanctions and penalties for state officials who abuse state resources. This paper has comprehensively examined U.S. legal provisions focused on the prevention of specific abuses related to a state’s institutional and financial resources. An array of other country examples illuminate the challenges that arise for deterrence and mitigation of such abuses when legal frameworks are unclear or incomplete, or when sanctions and penalties are inappropriate, insufficient, or poorlyenforced. Through this analysis, the authors have identified several elements that may contribute to an effective legal and regulatory framework. This list is not exhaustive, but provides a foundation for further research and analysis. These elements are outlined in the table on the following page. The presence of these legal and regulatory framework provisions alone is likely not sufficient to be effective; however, enforceable provisions that reinforce a perception of fairness are a starting point in the development of a strong structure to prevent the abuse of state resources. More research is needed to determine if this paper has identified the core set of elements required to establish the foundation of an effective regulatory and enforcement regime. An important next step will also be to determine whether a framework that contains all of these indicators – and is properly implemented and enforced – can in fact change the behavior of governmental actors as intended. Specifically, this research would evaluate whether such mechanisms have a discernible deterrence effect, and whether they raise confidence in and buttress the belief that perpetrators will be held accountable for abusing the state’s financial and institutional resources, and for betraying the public trust. 25