International Foundation for Electoral Systems overturned, the considerable delays of the appeals process often renders the applicable statute of limitations exhausted, and the sanction becomes unenforceable.174 Furthermore, the TCU’s ability to impose fines against a particular public officials may be eliminated if the defendant leaves public office.175 In the U.S., when an employee violates the Hatch Act restrictions on personnel activity, usage of the state’s physical property and/or official communication resources, there are a range of civil sanctions available for violations, including demotion, financial penalty (not to exceed $1,000), and suspension or removal from office.176 The MSPB may consider numerous mitigating or aggravating factors when determining which of these penalties is appropriate to administer.177 Additionally, criminal penalties, including imprisonment of up to three years, may be imposed where a federal executive branch employee engages in coercive efforts – intimidation, threats, commands, and the like – to motivate another federal employee to engage in or refrain from election activity.178 However, as the statute requires prosecutors to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the employee explicitly and intentionally coerced another employee, there are no reported cases where this statute has been used.179 For congressional Members and employees, and federal judges, a wide range of penalties for misconduct may be imposed by the ethics committees or judicial councils, including expulsion, monetary fines, or reprimanding letters, to name a few.180 The U.S. is an interesting case study given the evolution of the Hatch Act. Prior to 2012 amendments, an employee who violated the Hatch Act was subjected to either removal or a minimum 30-day suspension with no pay, regardless of how minor the violation.181 This provision was highly criticized as harsh and ineffective,182 as the limited penalty options and the complexity of the Act discouraged employees from reporting known violations to the OSC.183 The reformed provisions allow the MSPB to apply more appropriate penalties, and ensure that violations of the Hatch Act are more likely to be reported and enforced.184 See id. See id. at 33. 176 5 U.S.C.A. § 7326. 177 See Special Counsel v. Lewis, 121 M.S.P.R. 109 (2014), aff’d by Lewis v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 594 F. App’x. 974, 977 (Fed. Cir. 2014). See also S. REP. NO. 112-21, at 15 (2012) (“the Committee expects that, in selecting a penalty for a Hatch Act violation, the Board will consider the severity of the violation and other aggravating or mitigating factors, as the Board does with respect to non-Hatch Act violations”). 178 18 U.S.C.A. § 610 (1996). 179 See Lydia Segal, Can We Fight the New Tammany Hall?: Difficulties of Prosecuting Political Patronage and Suggestions for Reform, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 507, 531 (1998). A recent search of case law reveals that there are still no reported cases. 180 See Jack Maskell, Expulsion, Censure, Reprimand, and Fine: Legislative Discipline in the House of Representatives, Cong. Research serv., 2 (2013). 181 See Eileen Ambrose, Campaign Rules for Federal Employees Get an Update, BALT. SUN (Jan. 27, 2013), http:// articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-01-27/news/bs-md-federal-hatch-20130127_1_federal-employees-governmentemployees-campaign-rules; see also Shannon Azzaro, supra note 58, at 807; Alyssa Rosenberg, Employee advocates cite disparities in hatch Act enforcement, Gov. Exec. (Oct. 18, 2007), http://www.govexec.com/oversight/2007/10/ employee-advocates-cite-disparities-in-hatch-act-enforcement/25539/. Moreover, removal was the presumptive penalty unless the Merit Systems Protection Board found by unanimous vote that the violation warranted suspension instead. See S. REP. NO. 112-21, at 15 (2012). 182 See Shannon Azzaro, supra note 58, at 806-7; see also Eileen Ambrose, supra note 181. 183 See Eileen Ambrose, supra note 181; see also Alyssa Rosenberg, supra note 181. 184 See Eileen Ambrose, supra note 181; see also S. REP. NO. 112-21, at 15 (2012). 174 175 22