2
RUCHO v. COMMON CAUSE
Syllabus
ples, or political questions that must find their resolution elsewhere.
See Gill v. Whitford, 585 U. S. ___, ___.
Partisan gerrymandering was known in the Colonies prior to Independence, and the Framers were familiar with it at the time of the
drafting and ratification of the Constitution. They addressed the
election of Representatives to Congress in the Elections Clause,
Art. I, §4, cl. 1, assigning to state legislatures the power to prescribe
the “Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections” for Members of
Congress, while giving Congress the power to “make or alter” any
such regulations. Congress has regularly exercised its Elections
Clause power, including to address partisan gerrymandering. But
the Framers did not set aside all electoral issues as questions that
only Congress can resolve. In two areas—one-person, one-vote and
racial gerrymandering—this Court has held that there is a role for
the courts with respect to at least some issues that could arise from a
State’s drawing of congressional districts. But the history of partisan
gerrymandering is not irrelevant. Aware of electoral districting problems, the Framers chose a characteristic approach, assigning the issue to the state legislatures, expressly checked and balanced by the
Federal Congress, with no suggestion that the federal courts had a
role to play.
Courts have nonetheless been called upon to resolve a variety of
questions surrounding districting. The claim of population inequality
among districts in Baker v. Carr, for example, could be decided under
basic equal protection principles. 369 U. S., at 226. Racial discrimination in districting also raises constitutional issues that can be addressed by the federal courts. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U. S.
339, 340. Partisan gerrymandering claims have proved far more difficult to adjudicate, in part because “a jurisdiction may engage in
constitutional political gerrymandering.” Hunt v. Cromartie, 526
U. S. 541, 551. To hold that legislators cannot take their partisan interests into account when drawing district lines would essentially
countermand the Framers’ decision to entrust districting to political
entities. The “central problem” is “determining when political gerrymandering has gone too far.” Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U. S. 267, 296
(plurality opinion). Despite considerable efforts in Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 753; Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U. S. 109, 116–
117; Vieth, 541 U. S., at 272–273; and League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U. S. 399, 414 (LULAC), this Court’s prior
cases have left “unresolved whether . . . claims [of legal right] may be
brought in cases involving allegations of partisan gerrymandering,”
Gill, 585 U. S., at ___. Two “threshold questions” remained: standing, which was addressed in Gill, and “whether [such] claims are justiciable.” Ibid. Pp. 6–14.