12
CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON
THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment
Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 29 (1968). That is, powers related to
electors reside with States to the extent that the Constitution does not remove or restrict that power. Thus, to invalidate a state law, there must be “something in the Federal
Constitution that deprives the [States of] the power to enact
such [a] measur[e].” U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 850
(THOMAS, J., dissenting).
As the Court recognizes, nothing in the Constitution prevents States from requiring Presidential electors to vote for
the candidate chosen by the people. Petitioners ask us to
infer a constitutional right to elector independence by interpreting the terms “appoint,” “Electors,” “vote,” and “by Ballot” to align with the Framers’ expectations of discretion in
elector voting. But the Framers’ expectations aid our interpretive inquiry only to the extent that they provide evidence
of the original public meaning of the Constitution. They
cannot be used to change that meaning. As the Court explains, the plain meaning of the terms relied on by petitioners do not appear to “connote independent choice.” Ante, at
11. Thus, “the original expectation[s]” of the Framers as to
elector discretion provide “no reason for holding that the
power confided to the States by the Constitution has ceased
to exist.” McPherson, 146 U. S., at 36; see also ante, at 12–
13.
*
*
*
“The people of the States, from whom all governmental
powers stem, have specified that all powers not prohibited
to the States by the Federal Constitution are reserved ‘to
the States respectively, or to the people.’ ” U. S. Term Limits, supra, at 852 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Because I would
decide this case based on that fundamental principle, I concur only in the judgment.
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