12 CHIAFALO v. WASHINGTON THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment Rhodes, 393 U. S. 23, 29 (1968). That is, powers related to electors reside with States to the extent that the Constitution does not remove or restrict that power. Thus, to invalidate a state law, there must be “something in the Federal Constitution that deprives the [States of] the power to enact such [a] measur[e].” U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 850 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). As the Court recognizes, nothing in the Constitution prevents States from requiring Presidential electors to vote for the candidate chosen by the people. Petitioners ask us to infer a constitutional right to elector independence by interpreting the terms “appoint,” “Electors,” “vote,” and “by Ballot” to align with the Framers’ expectations of discretion in elector voting. But the Framers’ expectations aid our interpretive inquiry only to the extent that they provide evidence of the original public meaning of the Constitution. They cannot be used to change that meaning. As the Court explains, the plain meaning of the terms relied on by petitioners do not appear to “connote independent choice.” Ante, at 11. Thus, “the original expectation[s]” of the Framers as to elector discretion provide “no reason for holding that the power confided to the States by the Constitution has ceased to exist.” McPherson, 146 U. S., at 36; see also ante, at 12– 13. * * * “The people of the States, from whom all governmental powers stem, have specified that all powers not prohibited to the States by the Federal Constitution are reserved ‘to the States respectively, or to the people.’ ” U. S. Term Limits, supra, at 852 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). Because I would decide this case based on that fundamental principle, I concur only in the judgment.

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