Cite as: 591 U. S. ____ (2020) 9 THOMAS, J., concurring in judgment other condition of appointment. In fact, it did not even mention a pledge, which was set forth in a separate, unreferenced provision. See §29A.56.320. Thus, §29A.56.340 had no connection to the appointment process and could be enforced independent of the existence of any pledge requirement. While the Court’s description of §29A.56.340 as a law enforcing a condition of appointment may be helpful for the Court’s claim that Washington’s law was rooted in Article II, §1’s “power to appoint,” it is simply not accurate. Thus, even accepting the Court’s strained reading of Article II, §1’s text, I cannot agree with the Court’s effort to reconcile Washington’s law with its desired theory. In short, the Constitution does not speak to States’ power to require Presidential electors to vote for the candidates chosen by the people. The Court’s attempt to ground such a power in Article II’s text falls short. Rather than contort the language of both Article II and the state statute, I would acknowledge that the Constitution simply says nothing about the States’ power in this regard. II When the Constitution is silent, authority resides with the States or the people. This allocation of power is both embodied in the structure of our Constitution and expressly required by the Tenth Amendment. The application of this fundamental principle should guide our decision here. A “The ultimate source of the Constitution’s authority is the consent of the people of each individual State.” U. S. Term Limits, 514 U. S., at 846 (THOMAS, J., dissenting). When the States ratified the Federal Constitution, the people of each State acquiesced in the transfer of limited power to the Federal Government. They ceded only those powers granted to the Federal Government by the Constitution.

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