696 AFRICAN COURT LAW REPORT VOLUME 1 (2006-2016) 30. By stating in paragraphs 5 and 6 of the operative part of the judgment that “the Respondent State has violated its obligation to establish an independent and impartial electoral body provided under Article 17 of the African Charter on Democracy and Article 3 of ECOWAS Democracy Protocol and, consequently, also violated its obligation to protect the right of the citizens to participate freely in the management of the public affairs of their country guaranteed by the Article 13(1) and (2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights” and that “the Respondent State has violated its obligation to protect the right to equal protection of the law, guaranteed by the Article 10(3) of the African Charter on Democracy, Article 3(2) of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights and Article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”, the Court has, in my opinion, ruled beyond the bounds of the Applicant’s prayers, i.e. ultra petita. 31. The Court has, in effect, not complied with the Ne eat judex ultra petita partium principle which means that the judge must not “accord the Applicant more than is contained in the claims or adjudicate on 34 subjects not included in the respective pleadings of the parties”.34 Claims consist of “precise and direct statement of the subject-matter of the Application that a party to a proceeding before an international 35 jurisdiction invites this jurisdiction to declare and judge”35 and “are 36 essential in determining what the jurisdictional body must decide”.36 Consequently, the parties to a proceeding must “respect the distinction between claims and “the reasons”, given that the jurisdictional body 37 must make a formal ruling only in regard to the claims”.37 32. The International Court of Justice has, for example, held that it has a duty to respond to the requests of the parties as expressed in their final submissions, but also to refrain from ruling on points that are not 38 It also indicated that it included in the requests thus expressed.38 39 cannot rule beyond a request made by a party.39 34 “Latin phrase meaning “beyond what was asked”. The phrase is usually used in the sense that a judge should not rule “ultra petita”, that is, accord to the Applicant more than is contained in the Application or rule on objects not included in the respective submissions of the parties”, Dictionary of International Public Law, op. cit., p. 1112. 35 Dictionary of International Public Law, op. cit. p. 225. 36 Id. 37 Id. 38 Request for interpretation of the Judgment of 20 November 1950 in the asylum case (Colombia v Peru), Judgment of 27 November 1950, ICJ Reports 1950, p. 402; see also the Advisory Opinion on the Application for Review of Judgment No. 158 of the United Nations Administrative Tribunal, ICJ Reports 1973, pp. 207-208 (paragraph 87). For a more recent reference to the principle by the Hague Court, see its Judgment in the case concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras, Nicaragua intervener), ICJ Reports 1992, p. 437 (paragraph 126). 39 The Court having noted in the Application as well as in the reply given by counsel on 8 July 1969, that the Belgian Government did not found its claim on an infringement of the shareholders’ rights, it could not go beyond the claims as formulated by the Belgian Government and will not examine the matter further, Barcelona Traction Light and Power Company Limited (Spain v Belgium), ICJ Reports 1970, p. 37 (paragraph 49).