684 AFRICAN COURT LAW REPORT VOLUME 1 (2006-2016) comprise: i) 1 (one) representative of the President of the Republic; ii) 1 (one) representative of the President of the National Assembly; iii) 1 (one) representative of the Minister of Territorial Administration; iv) 1 (one) representative of the Minister of the Economy and Finance; v) 1 Magistrate appointed by the High Judicial Council; vi) 4 (four) representatives of the Civil Society two of whom shall be drawn from faith-based organizations, one from Non-Governmental non-religious Organizations and a Lawyer appointed by the Bar; vii) 4 (four) representatives of the party or political coalition in power; viii) 4 (four) representatives of opposition political parties or groups”. 128. The foregoing provision shows that the ruling political party and coalition, and political groupings of the Opposition are each represented by four (4) members. 129. The Court however notes that the Government in place is further represented by four (4) other members, namely, one representative of the President of the Republic, one representative of the President of the National Assembly, one representative of the Minister in charge of Territorial Administration, and one representative of the Minister in charge of Economy and Finance. 130. The Government is, therefore, represented by eight (8) members as against four (4) for the Opposition. 131. The Court observes further that the impugned law provides, in its Article 36, that the IEC Central Commission shall take its decisions by simple majority of the members present. 132. The imbalance in the composition of the Ivorian electoral body was also noted by the African Union Election Observer Mission (AUEOM) which, in its report of 27 October 2015, indicated as follows: “... In view of its composition, AUEOM found that there was an imbalance in the numerical representation of the ruling coalition and the political parties. AUEOM noted that the electoral authority does not command consensus within the political class, although the current IEC is the outcome of negotiations between the ruling party and the opposition parties, despite its heavy political component. From its exchanges with the socio-political actors, the Mission clearly perceived the mistrust of a section of the opposition and the civil society as to the impartiality of the electoral body...” (Registry translation) 133. The foregoing shows that the Ivorian electoral body does not meet the conditions of independence and impartiality and cannot be perceived as such. 134. In the same vein, the European Court of Human Rights, with regard to the independence and impartiality of tribunals, held that “in order to maintain confidence in the independence and impartiality of the 14 court, appearances may be of importance”.14 135. The Court, in conclusion, consequently holds that by adopting the impugned law, the Respondent State violated its commitment to establish an independent and impartial electoral body as provided 14 Case of Findlay v United Kingdom (Application No 22107/93), Judgment of 25 February 1995, para 76.